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Summary 
This master’s thesis studies the implications of introducing modern technology in the army’s 
supply chain on the command and control of this supply chain. It has been a qualitative study 
using both literature and a survey among a limited group of subject matter experts. 
The theoretical framework for this thesis is based on organisational theory, especially on the 
Mintzberg model of organisation configurations. Furthermore, elements of Strategic 
Technology Management add to this framework. In order to define emerging technologies 
promising for the army’s supply chain, a survey of several government and commercial 
documents has been done. Based on expected influence on the command and control of the 
supply chain two of these were chosen for further analysis. 
Research findings point out that command and control of the army supply chain will shift 
from the Army to a more centralised organisation outside of the army. It is expected that 
coordination and de-confliction of activity on land will remain the Army’s responsibility. 
Depending the technological developments, this can eventually be automated as well. 
Furthermore, mutual trust and integrating suppliers in comprehensive planning and training 
are indicated as important criteria for success in supplying the Army. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In military logistics, especially in the last part of armies’ supply chains, also known as the 
tactical level, technology has not had a large impact yet. Modern Enterprise Resource Systems 
have been introduced and some try to change from push supply towards a more pull orientated 
supply. Nevertheless, today’s tactical army supply chains have not revolutionary changed 
from the Cold War era supply chains. It is still about delivering supplies to the troops based 
on expected consumption and it still involves manual calculation and even gut feeling. One 
might wonder why and even become worried. In a testimony before the Senate on April 16, 
1997, US Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer stated: “There will not be a revolution 
in military affairs unless there is a revolution in logistics.” The desire to revolutionise 
military affairs implies need for revolutions in military logistics. Implementing modern 
technology could support this kind of revolution. 
Modern technology is changing our lives incredibly fast. From the early home computers and 
cell phones in the 1980’s to the modern-day tablet computer and smart phones, things 
technology has developed incredibly fast. From a few connected mainframes in the 1970’s to 
one billion webpages in 2014 (news.com.au, 2014). Over the last three decades, computers, 
cell phones, the internet, etc. have all become a part of our daily life, as well in work as in our 
social lives. For the generations born from the 1990’s the use of technology is as normal as 
turning on an electric light bulb by pushing a switch on the wall, or maybe even on the smart 
phone. 
Technology enables us to be connected to the world 24/7 with anyone in the world. People are 
no longer hedged by geographic location or social position and are able to meet in topic based 
communities. In addition to this, people changed from being a recipient of information into 
being in a more active role where they choose which information they want to receive. 
Looking at command and control, especially in the Army’s supply chain, there are several 
levels of command each with its own discretion and responsibility. Is this still necessary in an 
era where data can be processed automatically and information can be made available for 
everyone who needs it at any given moment? Perhaps it is time to think different. It appears 
credible to think of emerging technologies in logistics as a way to innovate both management 
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and organisational structures. Nowadays, if you order a book via your smartphone on 
Amazon.com today, it will be printed and sent tonight, and delivered tomorrow. In some 
years, it might even be delivered by a drone. Why is the staff sergeant still filling out paper 
reports? 
This master’s thesis will provide insight in the effects of emerging technology on the Army’s 
supply chain. Based on military and civil documents, it will broadly present the most 
promising technologies for the Army’s supply chain and determine possible implications to 
military supply chain management, better known as command & control of the supply chain. 
At the same time, it will study the relation between the military (logistical) organisation an 
emerging technology in the light of organisation theory, with a focus on Mintzberg’s 
configurations, and research from modern technology management and innovation theory. 
Besides the use of literature, this master’s thesis is based on the author’s experience in the 
logistical field of the Royal Netherlands Army. In the past three years, he has been appointed 
as exchange officer in the staff of the Norwegian Army. From that position, he has had the 
opportunity to observe the Norwegian Army from the inside. In order to mitigate the risk for 
bias, literature, theory and interviews with authority in the field of army logistics are used. 
Given the authors foreign background, a focus on the Norwegian Army’s supply chain will 
decrease the risk for bias even further. 
1.2 Previous research 
Although there is not much research done on the military supply chain (Listou, 2015, p. 16), 
some studies touch upon the subject. Listou’s dissertation “Supply Chain Designs for 
Preparedness” is one of the few available recent studies on military supply chains. 
Furthermore, Piggee (2002), as well as several non-academic papers written by government 
agencies write on innovation in logistics. None of the known research combines innovation 
with command and control of the supply chain. 
1.3 Main research question 
In 2002 US Army Lieutenant Colonel Aundre F. Piggee (2002, p. 3) wrote that future 
logisticians would be empowered by information technologies to provide the right support at 
the right time at the right place. They would no longer rely on “historical” data. Today in 
2017 expert experience prove the contrary. According to interviewed experts, supplying the 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
3 
troops in battle is still heavily relying on historical data and “gut feeling”. How come? Why 
does not the Army benefit from technological development in supplying the troops in battle? 
Is it not yet possible technically, not desired or did we not prioritise necessary investments in 
this field?  
The commander has a crucial role in both identification and implementation of technology 
(LeMay, 2009, p. 14). This implies that commanders in control of the Army’s supply chain 
should foster the positive effects of technological advance. Based on this it would be 
interesting to investigate the implications on command and control of the supply chain, when 
introducing modern technology. introducing modern technology in the army implementation 
of modern technology and thus improve the Army’s supply chain. This leads to the following 
main research question: 
How does modern technology influence the command and control of the 
Army’s supply chain?  
 
1.4 Research questions 
In both qualitative and quantitative studies a thesis is followed by several research questions. 
These questions are used as guidelines through the research and the writing of the report 
(Creswell, 2014). In this research, the following research questions were used: 
(1) What is command and control of the supply chain? 
(2) What are the characteristics of military organizations from an organisational 
theoretical perspective? 
(3) How can organisations handle new technology? 
(4) How is today’s supply chain and its command and control organised? 
(5) Which emerging technologies are most promising for the Army’s supply chain?  
(6) What are the disadvantages of implementing modern technology? 
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1.5 Definitions 
Before proceeding, the following paragraphs will explain the central phenomena supply chain 
and technology as used in this master’s thesis, linked to the central question and research 
questions.  
Supply chain 
Mentzer et al. (2001, p. 4) describe the supply chain as the three or more entities directly 
involved in all the upstream and downstream flows of products, services, finances, and/or 
information from a source to a costumer. On the other hand, Monk and Wagner (2013, p. 109) 
focus on the activities that occur during the transferring from raw materials into finished and 
delivered products. From the military perspective, the latter seems more suitable, because 
supply is not the only task for the entities in the military. But when taking a closer look, it is 
the first definition which fits better. This is confirmed by the Norwegian directive for logistic 
activities (Forsvaret, 2014a) which defines the levels1 within logistics and the supply chain as 
units and individuals. In his doctoral dissertation Listou (2015) uses a definition adapted for 
the defence organisation. Since it has the elements of the definitions by Mentzer et al. (2001) 
and Forsvaret (2014a) and it translates the supply chain definition into a more suitable one for 
armed forces: 
“…the physical, monetary and information flows and other relevant flows within 
a defence organisation, between defence organisation and other defence 
organisations in specific contexts such as e.g. multinational forces, and between 
defence organisations and their non-military supply chain partners.” (2015, p. 
7) 
 
Technology 
The word technology originates from the Greek language. It consist of the word techne 
(τέχνη), “art, skill, cunning of hand” and the suffix -logía (-λογία), the study of something 
(Liddell & Scott, 1993). According to Oxford Living Dictionaries Technology is “the 
application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes, especially in industry”. In its most 
narrow explanation it is about crafting tools for daily use, but technology is mostly used in a 
broader context. Especially in combination with the adjective ‘modern’ it points at an 
                                                
1 Level 1, the individual soldier; level 2, the unit; level 3, service-based organic logistics units; level 4, enhanced 
logistics support organised in deployable or stationary logistics bases and level 5, civil suppliers or producers 
(Forsvaret, 2014a, p. A2).  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
5 
application of knowledge in a revolting way seen from a certain point in time. In a military 
context, one could say that mechanisation (technology) has revolutionary changed warfare in 
only a century (LeMay, 2009, p. 2). Regarding supply, one can easily point at the invention of 
railway as a revolutionary technology at its time.  
In this master’s thesis, the expression modern technology is used to indicate the use of 
technology that recently has become available or that is to become available in the near 
future. 
1.6 Delimitations 
This master’s thesis is in search of the influence of modern technology on command and 
control in general and especially on the supply chain. It focuses on command and control of/in 
the supply chain of a deployed army. Supply chains are often designed for specific situations. 
One can find differences between the supply chain to support army units deployed in a 
mission in Afghanistan and the supply chain to support army operations on national of NATO 
territory. This thesis will focus on the general doctrine of the supply chain in the national 
context. Although the Army’s supply chain not necessarily stops or starts in the area of 
responsibility of the Army, the thesis focuses on activities in the Army.  
The thesis does not analyse the details of the technical use of technologies within the supply 
chain, although it might be touched upon in order to explain the implications for command 
and control. 
In choosing promising technologies for the supply chain, the focus has been on technologies 
with an obvious influence on command of control of the supply chain. Other technologies, 
although promising have been set aside. Technologies without influence on the command and 
control have been excluded as well. An example of these is the introduction of electric 
vehicles. Although an introduction of electric (fighting) vehicles in the Army would have a 
huge impact on the supply of fuel, this impact is foremost on the amount of fuel and not 
necessarily on the design and the command and control of the supply chain. Another example 
would be the introduction of additive manufacturing, which will influence the complexity of 
the spare part product range, but not the supply chain as such. 
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1.7 Structure of the report 
Chapter 2 describes the research design and method used. After this, a theoretical basis of the 
Army’s supply chain and its command and control is presented in chapter 3. Subsequently, 
chapter 4 will provide a theoretical framework from the perspective of organisational science 
and strategic innovation management. After this, the observations from the expert interviews 
will be presented in chapter 5. Next, chapter 6 introduces emerging technologies and 
designates the promising technologies for the Army’s supply chain. The effect of these on the 
command and control of the Army’s supply chain will be discussed in chapter 7. Chapter 8 
will discuss the researches findings and answering the research questions and finally give an 
answer on the main research question. Finally, chapter 9 summarises and concludes this 
master’s thesis. 
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2 Research design and method 
This chapter will provide insight in the thesis’ research model. In his dissertation, Listou 
(2015) stated: 
“Phenomena, such as supply chains, are social constructions that cannot be 
understood without simultaneously understanding their contexts and the 
individuals constructing these social phenomena.” (p. 12) 
 
Therefore, this research is done using the hermeneutic paradigm. Hermeneutists acknowledge 
that the social world is changing constantly. As a result, it is almost impossible to use or 
formulate laws like in for example physics or mathematics. In hermeneutics, no objective 
reality is presented, but rather several interpretations of reality (Jacobsen, 2015, p. 27) based 
on variables like for example cultural aspects or period in history. 
In order to understand the ‘reality’ this research started using an inductive approach while 
gathering information. This information was used in a deductive way to answer the thesis. 
Using a theoretical basis in organisation theory, this master’s thesis starts with an analysis 
into today’s command and control of the Army’s supply chain using organisation theory. 
After this, a survey of emerging technology which can be considered promising for the 
Army’s supply chain is done. The survey is based on several (foreign) technology and future 
trend surveys. Subsequently, the implications of these technologies on command and control 
in the supply chain are determined. As a result, expectations on future change and/or 
improvement of the Army’s supply chain command and control are presented. Figure 1 
visualises this research design 
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Figure 1, research design 
 
2.1 Collection of data 
Collecting data from unique sources is an important condition in research. In order to find 
theory suitable for this master’s thesis, the Norwegian Defence University College’s library 
and the internet proved to be important and valuable starting points. Furthermore, the tutor 
gave valuable advice on relevant literature. With a subject which has both a long scientific 
history on the military and organisational part and a rather young history on the technology 
part, finding scientific literature was both trouble-free and challenging. The latter illustrated 
by Listou (2015, p. 16), “[l]ittle academic literature exists on defence logistics”, and almost 
four decades earlier, by Van Creveld (1977, p. 231) who concluded the same when he wrote 
that;  
“Hundred books on strategy and tactics have been written for every one on 
[military] logistics, and even the relatively few authors who have bothered to 
investigate this admittedly unexciting aspect of war have usually done so on the 
basis of a few preconceived ideas rather than on a careful examination of the 
evidence.” (Van Creveld, 1977, p. 231) 
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2.2 Sampling and procedure 
Respondents for the interviews were chosen based on their experience and position in, or 
relation to the supply chain. As Jacobsen (2015) describes, experts can be chosen based on the 
expectance of the quality of information. The number of respondents is kept to five. Partly 
because not all the intended respondents were able to participate, partly in due to the limited 
time in which the research took place. The participating respondents were from Brigade 
North, the Operational Support Unit2 and the National Logistic Command / Norwegian 
Defence Logistic Organisation. 
The research has been reported to the data protection authority for scientific research (NSD 
Personvernombudet for forskning) and is registered as project number 57019.  
2.3 Questionnaire 
The interviews were held using an interview guide or questionnaire. This list of questions 
functions as a check-list and helps the interviewer asking the right questions in reaction on 
earlier answers. It helps the interviewer to stay focussed on what the respondent is saying. In 
this way, the interview is more or less held as a conversation.  
Each interview had a duration of approximately one and a half hour. It consisted of 13 main 
items and 15 sub items. The interviews were semi structured, which gave the opportunity for 
the researcher to stimulate long and in-depth answers (Ringdal, 2013). When necessary, the 
researcher used extra questions to get more in-depth answers. Three (sub)items were 
quantitative questions where the respondent was forced to give a metric evaluation. The 
metric answers on these questions were not used for any statistical analysis. The questions 
functioned as a trigger for the respondents to actually evaluate and explain their evaluation, as 
well as it gave the interviewer a way of evaluating coherency with other given answers. 
No recording device was used during the interviews. This deliberate choice, since the 
transcription of recorded interviews is a time-consuming method. Furthermore, experience 
from other master students was that a recording device kept respondents from speaking freely. 
The researcher made notes in key words during the interview. Immediately after the 
                                                
2 The Operational Support Unit is translated from Norwegian; Operasjonsstøtteavdelingen 
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interview, a report was written based on these key words. Subsequently the report was shared 
with the respondent to check for accuracy. 
Transcripts were made with the research questions as a directing factor as mentioned by 
Kvale, Brinkmann, Anderssen, and Rygge (2015). Both the raw data and transcriptions are 
approved by the respondents. The transcriptions were transformed and bundled per research 
question in appendix B. The interview guide or questionnaire is attached as appendix A.  
2.4 Sources of error 
In research on social constructions, both theory and interpersonal relations or factors are 
involved. In such cases, it is important to consider and evaluate various sources of error. 
The theoretical part of the thesis is based on both established and relatively new literature. It 
is important to acknowledge that every person has his own experience and understanding 
when met with new literature. Text may be interpreted in a different way than the author of 
the text intended. 
Interaction between people can be a source of error as well. Identical to written word, spoken 
word is also interpreted by the listener. The interviews held in this research have been 
conversations in which misunderstandings could have occurred. During the interviews, not 
only the spoken word was payed attention to, but also the non-verbal signs which everyone 
uses were observed and used to verify the content of the spoken word.  
During the interviews, respondents were asked on their expectations of new technology. This 
implies a certain understanding of the term ‘technology’. In order to mitigate differences in 
the understanding of the word, this was explained before starting the interview. 
2.5 Reliability and Validity 
Research must meet requirements for reliability and validity. Reliability implies that another 
researcher is able to come to the same results while using the same instruments. The results of 
a research are valid if the researcher has been measuring the phenomena he or she intends to 
research (Jacobsen, 2015; Ringdal, 2013, p. 96). 
It cannot be denied that the author’s experience within the field of army logistics, especially 
supply influenced the outcome of the research. For this reason, any use of personal experience 
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is clearly pointed out, as well as other sources are clearly referred to. This should give the 
reader a fair possibility to evaluate the reliability of these experiences and drawn conclusions.  
Depending the activity, the respondent was doing prior to the interview, the emotional state of 
a respondent can influence the answer given in an interview. Given the little number of 
interviews, such a temporarily emotional situation can have a large effect on the research’s 
reliability. In an attempt to mitigate this, the researcher asked the respondents to read and 
acknowledge the written reports which were made after the interviews. These were sent out 
the day after the interview. In that way, the respondents had the possibility to adjust any 
statement made based on an emotional state of mind. This respondent validation is considered 
a common method to validate ones findings (Jacobsen, p. 233). 
Having only a few respondents gives another reliability issue as well. As Jacobsen (2015) 
describes, even researchers with knowledge on the population tend make a biased samples (p. 
182). This would result in a misrepresentation of reality. Before sampling, the author tried to 
identify the best respondents by discussing whom to choose with colleagues working in the 
logistical field. Furthermore, this risk has been decreased by using theory and official 
documents in order to cross check the validity of answers.  
As described earlier, there seems to be no academic tradition in military logistics. As such, 
this should not be a problem for the research reliability, since many of the used theories and 
methods are similar to the ones in the civilian world.  
In order to strengthen the master’s thesis validity (have the intended phenomena been 
researched?), it uses a common conceptual framework. The questionnaire is designed and 
analysed based on the thesis’ theoretical background. 
The definitions of the supply chain and new technology were determined first and supporting 
theory has been chosen. Mintzberg is used as one of the classic organisational theory scholars, 
since his model of configuration suits the research best. Alternatively, among the large 
amount of theories on organisational behaviour, the four-frame model of Bolman and Deal 
(1991) could for example have been used. However, their four-frame-model does not have the 
same detail as presented in Mintzberg’s configurations model. Therefore, the latter was 
chosen as theoretical framework.  
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3 Supply theory in relation to Command 
and Control 
This chapter will firstly try to find an answer on the first research question. What is command 
and control of the supply chain? It will start describing the Army’s supply chain based on 
formal documents. This will partly answer on research question four as well, but that answer 
will be completed after the analysis of the observations in chapter 5. After the description of 
the supply chain command & control and Supply Chain Management (SCM) are described 
and compared. This leads to the answer on research question one. The chapter will conclude 
with a short evaluation of whom is executing command & control in the supply chain. 
3.1 The Army’s supply chain3 
While briefing a group of future army recruits, the author was once asked to explain what 
supplying an army was all about. The answer started as follows: 
“While doing their jobs in the front line, soldiers and units consume goods. After 
a while they want these goods to be resupplied. They write down their needs and 
give this note to the ones with the goods, us. We take their note, together with an 
empty box into our warehouse and fill the box with the things they need. After 
that we’ll get a truck to deliver the box to the soldiers in the front line and in the 
meantime, we ask our suppliers to resupply our warehouses…” 
 
Although a very simple explanation of the work done in the supply chain, it is actually the 
basis of the supply chain. Army units start operations with a certain level of supply present on 
and in their systems. Depending the operation and the actual use, they will get supplies from 
the Army’s supply chain.  
The Norwegian Army uses Standard Days of Supply (SDOS) in its supply philosophy 
(Forsvaret, 2014a, p. 10). A SDOS is based on a unit’s organisation (size, material, etc.) and 
operational requirements. It is primarily used in the supply of bulk goods in class I and III4. 
                                                
3 The draft concept for supplying the Norwegian Army (Hæren, 2015) is a classified document. In order to keep 
this master’s thesis publicly releasable this paragraph will give an overview of the supply chain in the army. It is 
based on the available open sources, interviews and the author’s own experience. Classified information is not 
included, but used only as background information while writing. 
4 Class I: Items of subsistence, e.g. food and forage, which are consumed by personnel or animals at an 
approximately uniform rate, irrespective of local changes in combat or terrain conditions. 
Class III: Petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) for all purposes, except for operating aircraft or for use in weapons 
such as flame-throwers, e.g. gasoline, fuel oil, greases coal and coke. (NATO, 2012, p. 27) 
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Multiplied by variables based on e.g. weather, terrain and combat intensity, it defines the 
amount of supplies being pushed forward to the Army’s units without them having to order 
these. 
As described in paragraph 1.4, a supply chain starts at the origin of the raw materials and ends 
as soon as the final product reaches its end user (Listou; Mentzer et al.; Monk & Wagner). 
The scope of this master’s thesis is the Army’s supply chain, but for an understanding of the 
chain, a more comprehensive description of the supply chain is necessary. 
 
 
Figure 2, the Army's Supply Chain.  
The upper part visualises the basic supply chain, where goods are delivered through every entity in the chain. 
The middle part visualises the exception where units are directly supplied from Logbase Land. This can be both 
units from Brigade North, thus supply bypassing the CSS battalion, or units outside the brigade, which are not 
supported by the CSS battalion. The lower part visualises direct supply to units from the NDLO or a civil 
supplier. 
 
Supplies are in principle delivered to the end user. The Norwegian Defence Logistic 
Organisation (NDLO) is responsible for the procurement and delivery of supplies to the 
Army’s Logistic Base (Logbase Land / LBL). As primary entry point into the Army, LBL acts 
as the interface between the more civil oriented part of the supply chain and the more military 
orientated part of the supply chain. Supplying the troops is mainly conducted by military 
assets, although under favourable conditions direct and/or civil supply from NDLO 
warehouses or civil suppliers towards end users is a possibility.  
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From LBL, supplies are forwarded towards the army Combat Service Support unit’s, mainly 
by the CSS battalion serving the Norwegian Brigade North. This will take place in the entire 
geographic area of operations, which will expose supplying units for comparable threats as to 
which combat units are exposed. It is for this reason that the Army leaves this role to military 
units trained and equipped for this environment.  
3.2 Command and control 
When used in a military context, most soldiers have an understanding of what is meant with 
the term command and control. But are these understandings the same? And how is this 
outside the military context. More than enough reason to elaborate on what command and 
control is.  
Maybe the most obvious document to look for a definition of C2, at least from a western 
soldiers perspective, is NATO’s Glossary of Terms and Definitions, AAP-06 (2013). 
Interestingly enough there is no definition for C2 listed in this document. It defines command 
and control separate. The first is defined as  
“The authority vested in an individual of the armed forces for the direction, 
coordination, and control of military forces.” (p. 2C8), 
  
the latter as  
“The authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of 
subordinate organizations, or other organizations not normally under his 
command, that encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or 
directives.” (p. 2C13) 
 
The Dutch Armed Forces use NATO’s definitions but give a broader explanation of them in 
the doctrine publication on C2. ‘Command’ is seen as the art to decide, to convey intend and 
to impose will to subordinated troops. Having command implies having the responsibility to 
decide and lead. After a decision is made, a commander has to organise, direct, follow and 
guide his subordinated units; ‘control’. It describes ‘command’ as the authority the 
commander has and ‘control’ as the execution of this authority. (Ministerie van Defensie, n.d., 
p. 14). The Dutch Armed Forces use the word “commandovoering” for the term C2. This 
word fits to the broader definition of C2 used by the Norwegian Armed Forces. They describe 
it as one of the joint functions being the term for planning and leading operations. It consists 
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of the organisation, its processes and procedures and the systems enabling the commander to 
lead and control the forces (Forsvaret, 2014b, p. 222).  
The above appears to be confirmed by Pigeau and McCann (2002) publishing their definitions 
of command and control as: 
“control: those structures and processes devised by command to enable it and to 
manage risk” and “command: the creative expression of human will necessary to 
accomplish the mission.”  
 
An interesting observation in the definition of control by Pigeau and McCann (2002) is that it 
is the entity in command who determines the control structures and processes. In other words, 
it is the organisation or commander to decide on how to execute control. 
In search of a universal definition of C2,  Vassiliou, Alberts, and Agre (2014) combine 
‘command’ and ‘control’ into C2 as follows: 
“Command and Control (C2) denotes the set of organizational and technical 
attributes and processes by which an enterprise marshals and employs human, 
physical, and information recourses to solve problems and accomplish 
missions.” 
 
This definition will be used in this master’s thesis to describe command and control. 
3.3 Supply Chain Management or Command & Control? 
Now that both the supply chain and command and control have been defined, the question is 
how these two interact. What is command & control of the supply chain? When managing a 
supply chain people will tend to think of Supply Chain Management (SCM). Although 
commonly used by theorists and practitioners, SCM is interpreted different among authors 
and logisticians (Mentzer et al., 2001, p. 2). A short analysis of the words implies that it is 
about managing the supply chain. This seems to be in line with the definition used by Mentzer 
et al.: 
“…supply chain management is defined as the systemic, strategic coordination 
of the traditional business functions and the tactics across these business 
functions within a particular company and across businesses within the supply 
chain, for the purposes of improving the long-term performance of the individual 
companies and the supply chain as a whole” (2001, p. 18). 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
16 
Although this is a very thorough definition it focuses mainly on business logistics. From the 
military operations perspective, more focus on getting effective results and on fulfilling the 
mission is desirable. This is underlined by NATO (2012, p. 65) in its Logistics Handbook, 
distinguishing between commercial and ‘just in case’ business. The difference is described 
even clearer by Pagonis and Cruikshank (1994, p. 210) stating; “The military focuses on life 
and death, whereas business measures profit” 
As part of the joint function5 sustainment (Forsvaret, 2014b, p. 145), supply is one of the 
preconditions for success on the battlefield. A closer look at the relations between these joint 
functions places Command and Control as the coordinating function between all joint 
functions. These relations are showed in the figure below: 
 
Figure 3, C2 at the core of the joint functions 
When projected on the supply chain C2 as defined before is similar to the definition of SCM 
by Mentzer et al. The difference lies in the focus on problem solving and mission 
accomplishment. In order to clarify the distinction between a focus on efficiency in the civil 
supply chain and effectiveness in the Army’s supply chain, this master’s thesis uses the term 
command and control instead of SCM.  
                                                
5 The Joint Functions translated from the Norwegian Joint Doctrine: Command and Control (C2) (kommando og 
kontroll), Intelligence (INTELL) (etteretning), Manouevre and Fires (operasjonell manøver og ild), Force 
Protectionn (FP) (styrkebeskyttelse), Information Operations (INFOOPS) (informasjonsoperasjoner),  
Electronic Warfare (EW) (elektronisk krigføring), Sustainment (understøttelse) and Civil Military Cooperation 
(CIMIC) (sivil-militært samvirke) (Forsvaret, 2014b, pp. 125-161). 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
17 
In answer on research question one, command & control of the supply chain can be defined as 
the set of organisational and technical attributes and processes used to organise and execute 
supply of (army) units synchronised with the other joint functions, in order to support the 
military mission.  
3.4 Who has C2 over the supply chain? 
As described earlier, forecast based supply is the preferred form of supply in the Norwegian 
Army (Hæren, 2015). This term might need some clarification. Forecasting, in supply, is a 
systematic method to predict a future demand (Persson, 2011, p. 30). There are four different 
kinds of forecasting according to Persson (2011); long-term, which has a horizon up to five 
years; medium-term, with scope between 1-3 years ahead, short-termed with a time span of 3-
12 months ahead and day, week or hour forecasts with a timespan between 6 hours and 4 
weeks. The Army, being at the tactical level uses the latter (Kress, 2002). These forecasts are 
primarily based on standardised consumption data per (weapon) system or unit (Standard Day 
of Supply) multiplied by factors based on the type of operation, terrain, weather, etc. During 
an operation forecasted resupply requirements are adjusted based on a daily reporting regime 
through the Army’s chain of command.  
The reports originate in the (combat) units based on input from individual systems and 
combat squads. The logistic branch in a battalion (S4) accumulates these inputs into logistic 
situational reports and logistic assessment reports and sends these to the brigade headquarters 
logistic branch (G4). With use of NATO’s Logistics Functional Area Services (LOGFAS)6 
this information is shared with the other stakeholders in the supply chain and the chain of 
command.  
Remarkably enough Kress (2002, p. 127) claims that there is “hardly any systematic 
forecasting activity” at the tactical level. Logisticians at the tactical level have to focus on the 
practical side of supplying army units by using Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). 
The fact that the NDLO, by its National Logistic Command, decides on which supplies are 
being forwarded to the Army, based on the reporting of the Army units confirms Kress claim.  
                                                
6 “LOGFAS is NATO’s logistic tool that allows for data exchange and reporting between NATO’s Headquarters, 
Units, and Troop Contributing Nations in all phases of planning and execution of logistic operations by use of 
an integrated series of computer programmes. These programmes use the same database format and therefore 
data can be shared easily.” (NATO, 2012, pp. 75-76) 
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This leads to the conclusion that the Army does not have C2 over the supply of goods, but 
only over the tactical execution done by army logistic units. Thus, in practice, the Army is not 
executing C2 of the supply chain or Supply Chain Management, it is in the hands of the 
NDLO. 
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4 Organisation theory & innovation 
In order to determine the influence of modern technology on the command and control of the 
supply chain, a closer look on military organisations is necessary. What are the characteristics 
of military organisations from an organisational theoretical perspective? (research question 2). 
A second question related to organisations and innovation is how technology can be handled 
(research question 3). Using classical organisational theory and theory on strategical 
technology management, this chapter answers on both research questions. 
4.1 The armed forces as a bureaucracy 
If one would ask a random person to describe the organisation structure of any armed forces 
in one word, he or she will most likely answer with hierarchic. This reflects, at least partially, 
the organisation structure. Hierarchic organisations organise their workforce or employees in 
order of rank, grade or class (Peter & Hull, 1969). Today’s hierarchical structure of armed 
forces originates from, among others, Fredrik the Great7 (1712-1786). He reformed the 
Prussian Army inspired by Roman legions and mechanical inventions. He introduced ranks 
and distinguishing uniforms, regulations, discipline, standardised equipment, command 
language and a new way to train soldiers; the drill. Furthermore, he separated the planning 
officers from those commanding the force, thus creating the line-staff organisation. By doing 
this he made the Army into an excellent war fighting machine. All the separate parts working 
together as a machine (Morgan, 1998). 
A hierarchical structure is one of the characteristics of the bureaucratic ideal described by the 
German social scientist Max Weber (1864-1920). Beyond this hierarchic and permanent 
structure, Weber describes the characteristics of the ideal bureaucratic organisation as being 
formal organised, obedience to superiors, impersonally and based on rules (Veiden, 2010). In 
many ways, this seems to fit to a military organisation with a line-staff structure, documented 
doctrines and procedures on how to conduct war and even own military disciplinary law. One 
can easily come to the conclusion that the organisation structure of armed forces resembles 
the bureaucracy.  
                                                
7 Others claim that it was Prince Maurice of Orange (1567-1625) who startet reorganising his troops and using 
drill and excersice inspired by the ancient Greeks and Romans. This could be an interesting topic for historic 
research on modern military bureaucracies. 
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It would be short-sighted to define the organisation structure as a bureaucracy alone. Of 
course, many attributes of the bureaucracy seem valid, especially in peace-time where New 
Public Management has found its way into the military organisation as well. Formalised 
reports, budget rules, training compendia, fixed planning cycles etc. cover most of a soldier’s 
day in peace time. But there is more.  
First of all, like most western armed forces, the Norwegian Armed Forces leadership 
philosophy is based on a form of Mission Command8. This means that a commander has an 
intention with the orders he assigns to his subordinates. It is this intention that is to be 
considered as the most important guide line while executing the orders. Assignments in 
Mission Command are more about the goals to achieve then about how to achieve them. 
Although the way in which Mission Command is used in the Norwegian Armed forces has its 
hierarchical and bureaucratic features as Plischke (2016) points out in his master’s thesis. It is 
also about showing leadership and breaking the rules of bureaucracy when they do not serve 
the goal. Or as General George S. Patton said: “A leader is a man who can adapt principles to 
circumstances.” 
In real life, other adjustments to the ideal Weberian bureaucracy have been made, in civil 
society as well as in the military. One of them is a democratisation of the hierarchy by ‘Works 
Councils’ (Heijnsdijk, 1994). Another is the use of peer commanders with a coordinating 
authority over the other. To describe the organisation of the Norwegian Armed Forces a closer 
look at it appears necessary, using Mintzberg’s theory as a framework.  
4.2 The armed forces from a Mintzberg point of view 
One way to describe the several different attributes of an organisation is presented by Henry 
Mintzberg. His generic model of organisations consists of six basic parts as shown in figure 4. 
At the base of the organisation, the executing part of the organisation is found, the operating 
core. At the very top of the organisation the management or leadership is found in the 
“strategic apex”. The larger an organisation gets; the more managers and middle managers 
are needed. These are placed in the “middle line” as “a hierarchy of authority between the 
operating core and the strategic apex”. Further, especially when organisations become more 
complex, Mintzberg acknowledges the need for a group of workers doing planning, control 
and other supporting duties. This part, often referred to as ‘staff’ he calls the 
                                                
8 Mission Command translated from the Norwegian ‘Opdragsbasert ledelse’ 
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“technostructure”. Besides this, most organisations have units to support the internal 
processes of the organisation, such as ICT offices, office building receptions, etc. This staff is 
called the “support staff”. The last and sixth part consists of the “ideology”. It consists of the 
traditions and beliefs, also referred to as the organisations culture or soul. It distinguish one 
organisation from the other. (Mintzberg, 1989).  
One can easily associate military organisations, for example the Norwegian Brigade North, 
with this model. The operating core are the soldiers in the battalions. The brigade commander 
is in the strategic apex. Between the soldiers and the brigade commander, battalion 
commanders, company commanders and platoon commanders can be seen as the line 
managers. Most of the brigade staff acts as the technostructure, supporting the brigade 
commander and line managers on planning and control tasks. The command sergeant majors, 
administrative officers, etc. form the support staff. 
 
Figure 4, Six Basic Parts of the Organisation (Mintzberg) 
 
In order to get the basic parts of the organisation working together, Mintzberg describes two 
requirements any organisation has to fulfil. The division of labour into various specialised 
tasks and the coordination of these tasks. The structure of the organisation is described by the 
way tasks are divided and coordinated. The coordination of tasks is divided in 6 different 
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coordination mechanisms, most which will be found within in almost every organisation. (1) 
“Mutual adjustment” is simply people informally talking to each other coordinating tasks. (2) 
“Direct supervision” is coordination trough orders, i.e. a sergeant giving instruction to his 
squad. (3) “Standardisation of work processes”, i.e. by means of Standing Operating Orders, 
drills or standardised planning processes such as NATO’s Comprehensive Operation Planning 
Directive. (4) “Standardisation of output”, with a focus on the result of the work done. (5) 
“Standardisation of skills”, e.g. by setting identical training requirements or having military 
officer schools setting the standard. (6) “Standardisation of norms”, where it is the set of 
beliefs, morals or culture influencing the way the work is done.  
Combining these coordinating mechanisms with the way decision power is distributed in an 
organisation, Mintzberg concludes with six structural configurations of how organisations can 
be explained, as mentioned before. These configurations are not templates, but rather a way of 
explaining the dynamics inside the organisation, organisations or at least parts of them will fit 
more than one configuration. Mintzberg’s configurations are listed in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Mintzberg's structural configurations 
Configuration 
Prime Coordination 
Mechanism Key Part of Organisation Type of Decentralisation 
Entrepreneurial 
organisation 
Direct supervision Strategic apex Vertical and horizontal 
centralisation 
Machine 
organisation 
Standardisation of work 
processes 
Technostructure Limited horizontal 
decentralisation 
Professional 
organisation 
Standardisation of skills Operating core Horizontal 
decentralisation 
Diversified 
organisation 
Standardisation of 
outputs 
Middle line Limited vertical 
decentralisation 
Innovative 
organisation 
Mutual adjustment Support staff Selected decentralisation 
Missionary 
organisation 
Standardisation of norms Ideology Decentralisation 
Political 
organisation 
None None Varies 
 
Given the vast amount of regulations, Standing Operating Procedures, drills, etc. as 
mentioned before, armed forces can be categorised as a machine organisation. On the other 
hand, as Mintzberg calls training “a key design parameter in all the work we call 
professional” (Mintzberg, p. 104), the focus on standardisation by skills would point in the 
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direction of the professional organisation. Although this might seem contradictory, both 
formalisation and training will lead to standardisations or, in other words bureaucratisation. 
Bureaucracies, especially in the view of Weber, are ideal organisations. Especially in large 
organisations which are divided in smaller units with each a line manager, executing 
predictive tasks with well trained personnel, bureaucracy works well. In fact “…bureaucracy 
prevails, first and foremost, because it works” (Benveniste, 1987, p. 6). In many cases, 
having routines, and rules to get the work done will empower organisations. In view of the 
successes of Fredrik the Great, after his implementation of regulations, discipline, hierarchy, 
etc., one can conclude that the phenomenon bureaucracy also functions well in the armed 
forces. However, in situations where tasks get unpredictable and/or rules no longer seem to 
apply, discretion is necessary (Benveniste). In these situations, professionals have to be given 
discretion and trust in their professional knowledge and ability to bring solutions. In other 
words; in these situations, the professional configuration seems to be more suitable. 
Mintzberg on the other hand, says that both the machine and the professional organisation 
have difficulties when they are confronted with change or innovation (Mintzberg, pp. 151 and 
190-191). So how can organisations handle change and innovation? 
4.3 Confronting change and innovation 
It is often said that people in general oppose change. But, as Dent and Goldberg (1999) 
describe, it is more complicated. Individuals do not oppose change as such. Different 
consequences of change for individuals might make systems, in other words organisations, to 
oppose change. With this perspective in mind, confronting change by the machine- and 
professional organisation is given a closer look. 
One of the characteristics of the machine organisation is it focus on control. This is why 
organisations in the business of control tend to organise as machine organisations. As well as 
organisations with a special focus on safety (Mintzberg, p. 138). When engaging in combat, 
an infantry unit cannot pause and have an informal group discussion with the commander on 
whom is to engage which target. 
The tasks in the machine organisation are coordinated by rules, regulations and 
standardisation. As soon as new situations occur, the first reaction is to use standardisation by 
new rules or regulations. When these don’t fit the new situation, the issue has to be pushed up 
in the hierarchy. The strategic apex, being the only element which can oversee the complete 
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organisation, has to decide. This might work in relative stable situations, but as soon as new 
situations occur more often the strategic apex will get overloaded. Especially in times of 
(rapid) change. Being separated, the workers have the knowledge on how to change, while the 
management has the power to decide. In this way, the top management is the bottleneck for 
change. Mintzberg gives two possible solutions for this bottleneck. Either, the organisation 
has to make a temporarily shift towards an entrepreneurial organisation by taking detailed 
lead for change from the strategic apex, or it has to empower the operating core to make the 
change. This would be a shift towards the innovative organisation. The machine organisation 
as such seems not suitable to handle change. This, as Mintzberg puts it, should not be 
surprising as: “[a]fter all, machines are specialized instruments, designed for productivity, 
not for adaption” (Mintzberg, p. 150). 
Knowing that the machine organisation handles change poorly, how about the other, the 
professional organisation? In the professional organisation, coordination is achieved through 
standardisation of skills. Professionals have a high level of discretion within their own 
expertise, since the way they execute their tasks is regulated through accredited education and 
experience. As long as situations can be handled from the professionals standardised 
approaches, problems get solved in the operating core. Problems arise as soon as a new 
situation does not fit the standardised sets of approaches. In these cases, a single professional 
(or a group of professionals working together) identifies the need for a solution. Since the 
problem exceeds the set of skills of the professional, he has to coordinate with others 
developing possible solutions. Subsequently a complex selection of the best solution has to be 
done, trying to get consensus even in situations of conflicting interest. Besides this, Mintzberg 
describes the professional as loyal to his profession, but not to the place he is practising it. 
This loyalty, combined with the given discretion leads to reluctance to cooperate with others.  
Since innovation require a comprehensive approach while the professional organisation is 
compartmentalised, innovation is difficult for such an organisation. As Mintzberg puts it: “… 
the reluctance of the professionals to cooperate with each other and the complexity of the 
collective process can produce resistance to innovation” (Mintzberg, p. 190). 
4.4 Summarising on organisation theory 
Summarising the above, the armed forces show aspects of both the machine and the 
professional organisational configuration of Mintzberg, both of which seek standardisation. It 
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can be concluded that the armed forces, and thus the Army, resemble the bureaucracy. Despite 
the vast number of rules and regulations to standardise either the work or the workflow in the 
armed forces, some instruments are in place to bypass this standardisation. One of the most 
eye-catching is the use of Mission Command and the discretion given to break certain 
regulations if they do not fit the situation.  
Nevertheless, both organisation configurations tend to handle innovation poorly. A 
(temporarily) shift towards a more entrepreneurial organisation might solve this. The 
questions remain, whether this is feasible and how this can be done. In the next part a possible 
approach is discussed in search for the answer on research question three. 
4.5 Strategic Technology Management and innovation 
‘Innovate or die’ is a motto that is heard often in both business, non-profit and government 
sectors. But as Getz and Robinson (2003) show, one should not step over a thorough analysis 
and plan on what to innovate on and how to use technology. No innovation just for the sake of 
innovation. 
This is where Strategic Technology Management (STM) surfaces. As Gregory (1995) 
describes, STM “…addresses the effective identification, selection, acquisition, development, 
exploitation and protection of technologies needed to maintain a stream of products and 
services to the market”. Although this definition clearly focuses on the profit sector, most of 
it is valid for the non-profit sector as well. In the military setting it would not be about 
maintaining a stream of products or services, but maintaining fighting power. An adjusted 
definition for use in a military context would be; ‘the effective identification, selection, 
acquisition, development, exploitation and protection of technologies needed to maintain the 
armed forces’ fighting power.’ 
One could say that the goal of STM is to innovate. Accordingly, these two terms are 
combined into Strategic Management of Technological Innovation. Schilling (2017, p. 1), 
defines technological innovation as “The act of introducing a new device, method, or material 
for application to commercial or practical objectives.” In order to improve technical 
innovation Schilling argues that companies or organisations should have a comprehensive 
strategy including a strategy for technological innovation (pp. 1-9).  
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Pointing at several other studies, Schilling claims that small organisations often outperform 
larger ones on innovation. For this reason breaking up the larger entity into smaller subunits 
and promote an entrepreneurial culture in these is seen as a method to deal with this 
disadvantage larger organisations have (Schilling, p. 215). This seems to be in accordance 
with the observation that visionary leadership turns strategy into organisation in the 
entrepreneurial organisation (Mintzberg).  
Based on this observation, it seems tempting to organise technological innovation 
decentralised in subunits, with this entrepreneurial approach stimulated. However, there are 
some downsides with this approach. First of all, decentralising will make the innovation 
customised to this decentralised subunit. The question in that case is whether the technology 
serves the organisation as a whole. Furthermore, the possibility for redundancy and even 
ambivalence will increase. Centralising on the other hand, can have positive effects regarding 
to coherency of innovation. A centralised organisation with a tight command and control 
structure, e.g. the armed forces, is more able to impose change through the entire organisation. 
The downside of this is that adjustments or changes in the technological innovation have to go 
through the entire chain of command, which will slow down innovation (Schilling, p. 217). 
The choice whether to centralise or decentralise technological innovation seems to be 
unresolved. “[I]n some cases, centralization can enable significant innovation to occur more 
rapidly, and in other situations, decentralization fosters more innovation by enabling 
managers to respond quickly to local needs.” (Schilling, p. 230) 
As seen with Mintzberg’s machine and professional organisations, a high level of 
formalisation and standardisation lead to a high level of bureaucracy. This is very alike the 
term “mechanistic9”, used by Schilling. Concluding that these kinds of organisations are not 
suitable to facilitate innovation, the alternative could be the “organic10” organisation. This 
organisation structure has an extreme low level of bureaucracy and structure, but this kind of 
(non-)structure seems unsuitable for larger organizations (Schilling, p. 220). 
                                                
9 Mechanistic: an organization structure characterized by a high degree of formalization and standardization, 
causing operations to be almost automatic or mechanical. (Schilling, p. 218) 
10 Organic: an organization structure characterized by a low degree of formalization and standardization. 
Employees may not have well-defined job responsibilities and operations may be characterized by a high degree 
of variation. (Schilling, p. 218) 
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A solution that certain companies, especially in the production industry, developed is the 
ambidextrous organisation. This kind of companies have a more mechanical organisation in 
their production divisions, while the divisions which focus on the radical technological 
innovation show a more organic structure (Schilling, p. 220). In organisations or situations 
where technological innovations lead to organisational change, it is hard to imagine that this 
is a preferable organisation. Based on this observation an ambidextrous organisation seems 
not always suitable for improving and implementing innovation in the armed forces. 
So how can bureaucratic organisations handle modern technology? The answer on research 
question three seems not that obvious. It appears that, depending the kind of implications a 
technology has, the organisation has to choose between a central guided development and 
implementation or a more decentralised approach. If technology can be applied locally, a 
decentralised approach could be the most effective, in case of a technology with effects for 
the entire organisation, the central guided approach is more appropriate. Given the 
bureaucratic organisation as a starting point for this decision, a technology strategy in the top 
management is crucial. 
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5 Results of observations 
In pursuance of research questions number three, four and five, experts working with a role in 
the supply chain of the Norwegian Army were interviewed. Although too few experts (5) 
were interviewed to do a statistic analysis of their answers, the interviews give an overview of 
the organisation and command & control of the supply chain, as well as an interesting 
indication of how they look at implementing modern technology in the supply chain. In order 
to analyse the results, the interviews have been transcribed in light of the research model 
(appendix B). Using an interview guide, the interview focused on the design of today’s supply 
chain, C2 in the supply chain and the expectations of modern technology for the improvement 
of the supply chain and its C2. The following part will analyse the answers given. 
5.1 The supply chain, design and C2 
First of all, research question four: How is today’s supply chain and its command & control 
organised? Referring to Listou (2015), describing supply chains as social constructions, the 
overview of the supply chain and its C2 given in paragraph 3.1 is not enough. In this part, the 
respondents’ reality of the social construction is presented. All respondents gave a nearly 
equal description of the supply chain. Three of them chose to describe C2 starting at the 
National Joint Headquarter (NJHQ), the two others focused on the part they work with in 
practice. This section gives an overview of the respondent’s perception of the supply chain 
and its C2. Figure 5 visualises the supply chain in the composite view. 
 
Figure 5, the supply chain described by respondents 
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All logistics, including supply, is controlled by the J4 branch at the NJHQ, since the Chief 
NJHQ is commanding all armed forces in operations. J4 is responsible for incorporating 
logistics into the operational plans. Based on operation plans and established standards, the 
bulk goods (fuel, ammunitions, potable water, field rations) supply is planned and 
incorporated in the operation plans.  
The NJHQ has given coordinating authority11 over logistics to the National Logistic 
Command (NLC), more or less enabling the NLC to execute logistics on behalf of 
commander NJHQ. The NLC is the executing body of the NDLO within the command 
structure of the Armed Forces. In the near past, the NLC led both Regional Logistic 
Commands and Logistic Base Land. Most respondents pointed out that from 2018, Logistic 
Base Land (LBL) will be a part of the Army, as described in the Defence White Paper 
(Forsvarsdepartementet, 2016, p. 81). Until 2018, the G4 branch in Brigade North’s 
headquarter is coordination all logistic. From 2018, a tactical headquarter for the Army, the 
National Land Operation Centre, will be established (Forsvarsdepartementet, p. 56). Although 
it has not been decided on a new distribution of responsibilities yet, four respondents expect 
the Chief of the Army to take lead in the supply chain through a new G4 level at the tactical 
headquarters. 
All respondents call for a clarification of responsibilities in the chain. At the same time, there 
is a general expectation that the new structure of the armed forces, as given in the White 
Paper, will result in in more clarified roles and responsibility. An interesting observation, 
stated by three respondents, is the fact that the supply chain has never been put to the test. 
Thereby it remains a theoretical construct, its functioning never been tested in real life. 
One respondent pointed at another topic in the White Paper. The Norwegian Government 
intends to review the entire support structure of the Armed Forces, including logistics. The 
desire is to rely more on civil suppliers. In his point of view, this askes for an adequate 
interface between the civil and military part of the supply chain. 
                                                
11 The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions 
or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or two or more 
forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their 
representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the 
agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to 
obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority. (NATO, 2013, p. 2C15) 
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Summarising and answering research question three, one can conclude that the respondents’ 
reality of the supply chain corresponds largely with the description given in paragraph 3.1. 
Nevertheless, the respondents point out the need for more a clear distribution of 
responsibilities among the actors in the supply chain. In general, they expect the establishment 
of a tactical command at army level to partly solve this issue. 
5.2 Expectations of modern technology 
As part of the survey to identify promising emerging technologies for the Army’s supply 
chain, the respondents were asked questions related to research question five; Which 
emerging technologies are most promising for the Army’s supply chain? Naturally these 
questions were combined with research question six; What are the disadvantages of 
implementing modern technology? This paragraph summarises the observations. 
The highest expectations of modern technology were on improving forecast abilities. Four of 
the five respondents reported high expectations in this field. Expectations vary from the 
improved use of existing data technology, up to automated reporting from weapon systems 
into the supply chain. This improvement would increase the logistical situational awareness, 
also known as the recognised logistical picture (RLP). Four respondents believe that making 
better use of the current Enterprise Resource System (ERP), would be a tremendous step 
forward in improving the supply chain. 
About a decade ago, SAP was chosen as the new integral ERP system for the Armed 
Forces. Its implementation started in 2002 and is spread over several sub-projects. The 
latest project, FIF 3.0 is focused on logistics, including a joint solution for acquisition, 
supply, maintenance, material management, finance and deployable solutions. It 
started in 2011 and became available for users in 2016. It is meant to give better 
access to logistical information across the Armed Forces by sharing it across branches 
and disciplines, while data only needs to be registered once. (Forsvaret, 2015) 
The lack of (secure) bandwidth when deployed is given as one of the reasons why SAP has 
not yet given the expected improvements. Furthermore, one respondent stated that the basic 
information needed to forecast supplies is not up to date, it is partly based on experience 
dating from the last century. According to this respondent, the effect of this out-of-date 
information is that executing supply in the Army often is based on “gut feeling”.  
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Two other respondents took forecasting one step further. They expect it to become possible to 
connect weapon systems into the logistical network. In this way, it would become possible to 
have the weapon system reporting on fuel consumption, ammunition, needed repairs and 
spare parts, etc. Combined with shared information on its location and activity, a sophisticated 
computer program could be able to predict the system’s supply needs and the best location 
and moment of resupply. 
All respondents point out rigidity around information security and network security as a 
constraint when taking into use data tools. The high demands on information security exclude 
several systems available on the open marked, since these often use relatively open 
connections over the internet. As one respondent summarised:  
“The Armed Forces have a special need for classifying and shielding 
information. In practice, many of the available and network-based logistics 
solutions are not approved by the Norwegian National Security Authority 
(NSM)12 and/or the Defence Security Department (FMA)13.”  
 
Other respondents exclaimed similar constraints linked to the use of network based logistic 
data systems. The constraints associated with security are obstructing implementation of 
modern data tools in the logistical field according to two respondents. 
All respondents have a strong believe that modern technology eventually will improve the 
supply chain. At the same time, they point at the increased vulnerability of the supply chain 
due to reliance on networks and digital products. They urge for redundancy and a back-up-
plan for situations where the support system is off line or compromised by enemy actions. 
5.3 Other findings 
Besides expectations on clarification of responsibilities and on technological based progress, 
four respondents reported that the supply chain has not been tested to its full extent. During 
exercises the focus is on combat units, leaving the supply chain to cover the real-life support 
of the exercise. They have the feeling that exercising the supply chain, either in real life or in 
simulated environments would improve both the supply chain itself as well as the general 
                                                
12 The Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) is a cross-sectoral professional and supervisory authority 
within the protective security services in Norway. 
13 The Defence Security Department (FMA) focuses on security and counterintelligence within the department of 
defense. 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
32 
officer’s understanding of supplying an army. One respondent reported that during a 
simulated exercise in 2016, the volume of supply and transportation for the first time became 
clear to most of the present participants, all experienced planning officers. 
This points clearly at competence as an area of improvement. But not only competence as a 
general understanding of supply in the Army has been mentioned by the respondents. Many 
answers given point at the need to build competence and experience in the use of SAP as a 
supporting tool in the supply chain. Both in order to convince people of the need to fill the 
system with accurate data, as well as to use its reporting possibilities in planning and 
executing for supplying. 
As mentioned before, one of the respondents pointed at the White Paper and a more civil 
engagement in supplying the Norwegian Armed Forces. He clearly pointed out the framework 
agreement with civil corporations for supply of the Norwegian Home Guard (Skipsrevyen, 
2015) and (Forsvaret, 2016). By contract, these two civil corporations have become 
responsible for setting up and supplying Home Guard units directly in their assigned 
geographical location in case of a national crisis. If these agreements are to become a model 
for the future supply of army units, the respondent argued that the focus of C2 in the Army’s 
supply chain has to be on the interface between the civil and military world. Both in the 
information domain as well in the physical domain. 
Another issue brought up by two respondents was the threat to large logistical and stationary, 
installations. According to threat analysis and experiences from e.g. the battles in Ukraine 
(also acknowledged by the Dutch study on the development of logistics (Koninklijke 
Landmacht)), any unit which is stationary for longer than 2 hours will be attacked with long 
range precision weapons. This askes for “a compromise between maximising mobility and 
security versus physical protection”. In other words, small mobile units with a high level of 
independence.  
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6 Identifying promising technology 
This chapter seeks an answer on research question five; Which emerging technologies are 
most promising for the Army’s supply chain. In an attempt to identify these most promising 
emerging technologies the following set of different documents and expert opinions is used to 
get an overview on available and recognised technologies. 
- The Logistic Trend Radar, by DHL (Kückelhaus & Chung, 2016); 
- The Australian DoD scoping study on automated and autonomous systems for CSS 
(Ivanova, Gallasch, & Jordans, 2016); 
- A Dutch study on smart and robust logistics in the land domain (Koninklijke 
Landmacht, 2017); 
- Globale Trender mot 2040; FFI-rapport 2015/01452 (Beadle & Diesen, 2015); 
- Answers on question number 10 of the interview guide. 
Based on this overview and the expected influence on command & control of the supply 
chain, research question six will be answered. 
6.1 Logistic Trend Radar 
The Logistics Trend Radar (Kückelhaus & Chung) is one of the most comprehensive reviews 
of future trends, projecting both social and technological trends. It is periodically issued by 
DHL Trend Research, a division of Deutche Post DHL Group. Although not an independent 
source, it is seen as “…an inspiring benchmark for strategy and innovation”  (Cichosz, 
Goldsby, Knemeyer, & Taylor, 2017).  The DHL Logistic Trend Radar shows 12 technology 
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trends, divided in high, medium and low impact technologies arranged two groups. The first 
those with expected impact within 5 years, the second with expected impact beyond 5 years.  
 
Figure 6, the logistics trend radar by DHL (Kückelhaus & Chung) 
 
Naturally, the DHL Logistic Trend Radar has a focus on business logistics. Nevertheless, a lot 
of the described technologies could have impact in a military supply chain as well. Especially 
those with high impact (close to the centreline of figure 4). A short description of the 
technologies with high impact will be given.  
Big Data: Large amounts of data are being used in logistics. It is expected that analysing this 
data can have the potential to improve the supply chain, optimising “capacity utili[s]ation” 
(p. 17) and reduce risk. 
Internet of Things: Combined with Low-cost Sensor Technology, this will enable systems to 
be an active part in the supply chain by generation orders automatically. As well as automated 
monitoring of supply goods in stock and on the move. 
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Robotics & Automation: Combined with Self-Driving Vehicles and even Unmanned Aerial 
vehicles, this might enable a more reliable logistic process and open opportunities for delivery 
even in the most hostile environments, without putting a man’s life on the line. 
6.2 Australian Department of Defence: Automated and 
autonomous systems for Combat Service Support14 
In 2016, the Australian Department of Defence conducted a study on opportunities for the use 
of automated and autonomous systems within Combat Service Support (Ivanova et al.). The 
study started with a technology scan resulting in a large number of emerging technologies in 
logistic field. This number was narrowed down through a review of military technology 
reports, discussions with Australian Defence Force logistic officers and finally through a 
workshop with Australian Army subject matter experts on logistics. This resulting in three 
promising technologies for the Army’s supply chain: 
- Predictive analytics 
- Unmanned Aerial Systems for last-mile logistics 
- Semi-autonomous convoys 
6.3 Smart and robust logistics 
As part of the Further Development of the Armed Forces15 the Netherlands Army Logistic 
School conducted a study on the development of logistics in the land domain (Koninklijke 
Landmacht, 2017). Promising technology for the Army’s supply chain was not presented as 
such, nevertheless it is clear that it takes the following emerging technologies as starting point 
for describing future army supply chains: 
- Electric drive 
- Autonomous systems for supplying the troops (UAV/UGV16) 
- Predictive analytics 
- Additive manufacturing or 3D printing 
                                                
14 The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics. (NATO, 2013) 
15 Translated by the author from Dutch: “Doorontwikkeling Krijgsmacht” (DOKM), a comprehensive study by 
the Dutch Department of Defence on the Development of the Armed Forces. 
16 UAV: Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, UGV: Unmanned Ground Vehicle. 
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6.4 Globale Trender mot 2040 
The Norwegian Defence Research Establishment’s report ‘Globale Trender mot 2040’ 
(Beadle & Diesen) is a comprehensive report on global trends for the development Norway’s 
security and defence strategy. As such it is not meant to give insights in specific technological 
developments in the field of logistics. Nevertheless, it foresees two technologies which also 
have its implications on the supply chain. Firstly, the further development of information 
technology. Until now this technology has been used to improve existing materiel and 
concepts. In the next 10 to 20 years information technology will supposedly change the way 
the military (and thus the military supply chain) works. This prediction is based on the 
expected synergy effect between (1) improved sensor technology, (2) improved real-time 
information and communication technology and (3) improved guiding of long range weapon 
systems. The latter of course has little direct relation to the Army’s supply chain. 
Secondly Beadle and Diesen (2015) foresee an increased focus on unmanned systems in all 
domains (land, maritime and air). Although motivated by the wish to reduce own losses, it can 
have interesting implications for the supply chain. 
6.5 Norwegian Subject Matter Experts 
Although a more extensive transcript of the interviews has been given in chapter five, a short 
repetition of the subject matter experts opinion on promising technology. As part of the 
survey on emerging technologies, the respondents were asked to list promising technologies 
from their point of view. Although other technologies were mentioned, the two of which they 
have the most expectations are predictive analytics (also mentioned as automated ordering) 
and unmanned vehicles in the supply chain.  
6.6 Summary 
To find an answer on research question five, the different expectations of new technology 
have been classified based on resemblance. This resulted into four categories of technology: 
Information Technology, autonomous vehicles and/or drones, Additive Manufacturing and 
‘Other Technologies’. Table 2 lists the technology expectations in the field of logistics, 
especially CSS from all sources. 
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As described in the first chapter, additive manufacturing technology lies beyond the scope of 
this master’s thesis. The category ‘Other Technologies’ is too diverse to result in further 
general implications for command and control in the supply chain. Thus, answering on 
research question six, two categories remain as the most promising technologies for further 
analysis of their influence on the C2 of the supply chain; Information technology, especially 
predictive analytics and forecasting, and autonomous aerial and ground vehicles. 
 
Table 2: technology expectations in CSS 
 Common denominator 
 
Source Information technology Autonomous vehicles 
and/or drones 
Additive 
Manufacturing 
Other Technologies 
Australia - Predictive Analytics - Unmanned Aerial 
Systems for 
distribution in the ‘last 
tactical mile’ 
  
Netherlands - Predictive Analytics - Autonomous systems 
for supplying the troops 
- 3D Printing - Electric Drive 
Interviews - Predictive Analytics / 
forecasting 
- Automated ordering 
- Autonomous Vehicles - 3D Printing - Solar Energy 
- Simulation 
Globale 
Trender FFI 
- Information technology will 
change military organisations 
and concepts. 
- Increased focus on 
unmanned systems. 
  
Logistic Trend 
Radar (DHL) 
- Big Data 
- Internet of Things 
- Low-cost Sensor Technology 
 
- Self-Driving Vehicles 
- Robotics & 
Automation 
- Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles 
- 3D printing - Augmented 
Reality 
- Bionic 
Enhancement 
- Digital Identifiers 
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7 Promising technologies further examined 
Before discussing the influence of information technology and unmanned vehicles on 
command & control of the supply chain, a closer look at these two technologies is necessary. 
What do they imply? This chapter will elaborate on these two technologies, before chapter 
eight discusses the influence on C2 of the supply chain. 
7.1 Information technology 
As described before, the expectations on information related technologies are high. Chapter 
six and paragraph 5.2 show high expectations especially on Data Science, Predictive 
Analytics and Big Data (DPB). Before analysing the consequences and possibilities of DPB in 
the C2 of the supply chain, a closer look at the terms Predictive Analysis and Big Data is 
necessary. 
Being a relative new field of research, there is little literature and no consensus on the 
terminologies involved in DPB and its implication for SCM or C2 of the supply chain yet 
(Gunasekaran et al., 2017; Provost & Fawcett, 2013; Schoenherr & Speier-Pero, 2015; Waller 
& Fawcett, 2013). The next part will deal with the definitions of Data Science, Predictive 
Analysis and Big data. In the light of the scarce number of publications on the topic, these are 
mainly, but not entirely, based on the publication of Waller and Fawcett (2013).  
Data Science 
Provost and Fawcett (2013) describe Data Science as “a set of fundamental principles that 
support and guide the principled extraction of information and knowledge from data” (p. 52). 
This includes data-mining, but also the ability to analyse business problems from a data 
perspective. Applying Data Science requires both analytical skills and profound knowledge of 
the business in which it is applied, also referred to as domain knowledge (Waller & Fawcett). 
This connection and requirement for domain knowledge led to a proposed definition for SCM 
Date Science by Waller & Fawcett:  
“SCM data science is the application of quantitative and qualitative methods 
from a variety of disciplines in combination with SCM theory to solve relevant 
SCM problems and predict outcomes, taking into account data quality and 
availability issues.” (p. 79) 
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This definition seems to be the best available at the moment, although the authors welcome 
any research to either verify, adjust or reject their definition. 
In a military context, the requirement of domain knowledge in order to be able to apply Data 
Science requires employees with both knowledge and experience on military (logistic) 
operations as well as a wide set of analytical skills. Given the fact that there are very few 
organization apart from the Armed Forces where one can gain experience on military 
operations, this leads to the conclusion that the use of SCM Data Science in the military 
context has to have a military component. Data scientists with experience in military logistic 
operations seems to be a prerequisite for the use of Data Science in the Army’s Supply chain. 
Predictive Analytics.  
In their article, Waller and Fawcett (2013) propose a definition for Supply Chain Management 
(SCM) predictive analysis: 
“SCM predictive analytics use both quantitative and qualitative methods to 
improve supply chain design and competitiveness by estimating past and future 
levels of integration of business processes among functions of companies, as well 
as the associated costs and service levels.” (p. 80) 
 
Although this definition focuses on commercial business, it can be used for non-profit or 
military use as well. Its focus is on the improvement of SCM or in the military context on the 
C2 of the supply chain. Even though this could be a way to use predictive analytics, the 
expectations for use in the military supply context are more on using predictive analytics in 
order to improve the execution of supply. In that context, the proposed definition of logistics 
predictive analytics seems more suitable: 
“Logistics predictive analytics use both quantitative and qualitative methods to 
estimate the past and future behaviour of the flow and storage of inventory, as 
well as the associated costs and service levels” (Waller & Fawcett, p. 80) 
Both definitions point at quantitative and qualitative methods as the tools used for an analysis 
which leads to an estimate on future (and past) behaviour. Shmueli and Koppius (2011) use 
the predictive analytics for the building and assessment o models aimed at making empirical 
decisions. Whereas ‘empirical’ points at the use of facts as the basis for predictions about 
future behaviour or observations. Both Shmueli & Koppius and Waller & Fawcett point out 
statistic and data mining as disciplines used in predictive analytics. The latter extends 
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of disciplines with forecasting, optimisation, discrete event simulation, applied probability 
and analytical mathematical modelling. It is underlined that these disciplines are related to 
predictive analytics, but they seem less comprehensive. Statistics is a quantitative discipline 
whereas predictive analytics is both quantitative and qualitative as described in the given 
definitions. The same with forecasting, which is about the future, whereas predictive analytics 
is about the past and the future (Waller & Fawcett). 
The question arises what a military supply chain can do with predictive analytics. The answer 
seems obvious; to predict future behaviour or consumption based on a given scenario and/or 
plan for the operation. But what are these analyses built on? What is the input for predictive 
analytics? This is where ‘big data’ comes into play. 
Big data 
Big data is a widely used term, often used to describe terms as defined above. In a literal 
sense, it points at the infinite amount of available data which has become available since the 
beginning of the digital age. In one of his video lectures, Hilbert (2015) elaborates on the term 
big data using five characteristics. He explains it being a lot of data (1), which becomes 
available as a result of our (digital) activity, a ‘digital footprint’ (2). Given the fact that human 
activity is not recorded comprehensively, not every database is complete, but the amount of 
big data makes it possible to fill information gaps from one database with information from 
another. Databases are complementary to each other by using ‘data fusion’ (3). Another 
characteristic is the nearly real-time availability (4) of big data. Hilbert describes the effect the 
vast amount of data has had on machine learning as a fifth characteristic, but one can discuss 
on whether this is a characteristic or a result.  
Summarising, big data is exactly what the words say. A vast amount of available data, often 
generated in real time by every entity with a role in the digital world (both humans and 
machines). Given its magnitude big data can be ‘internally’ complementary. 
As described above, big data is the basis for predictive analytics. As such, the next question 
that arises is if and how much big data is available in the military supply chain. This will be 
discussed in chapter 8. 
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7.2 Autonomous vehicles 
Before the influence of autonomous vehicles on C2 of the supply chain can be discussed, one 
has to define what these systems are. As such, unmanned vehicles are nothing new. After the 
World War I, the Russian Army experimented with a radio-controlled tank, the ‘Телетанк’. 
These vehicles were remotely controlled from other tanks and were used in the 1939 Soviet-
Finnish war (Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, 2016, p. 12; Телетанк). In modern wars and 
operations, the use of unmanned, but remotely piloted vehicles, both on ground (UGV) and in 
the air (UAV) has become quite common. Examples of these are remotely piloted vehicles to 
dismantle bombs and ordnance, the Black Hornet Nano, the MQ-1 Predator, etc.  
The real emerging technology is the autonomy of movement. Using modern technology, it has 
now become possible to let the vehicles move autonomous to their destination. Autonomous 
systems not only move automatically, but they are able to react intelligent on unexpected 
situations (Forsvarets forskningsinstitutt, p. 12). The last fifteen years, scientists and industry 
have been developing this technology and readiness is almost met. The remaining problems 
are connected to the perception of the environment (Anderson et al., 2014, p. 74). On these 
issues, there seems to be a difference between aerial and ground vehicles. The environment in 
the air tends to be less complex than on the ground. On aerial systems several solutions are 
under development, already in 2013 there were successful trials with the ‘AirMule’ (Tactical 
Robotics Ltd, 2013), an autonomous aerial vehicle that can evacuate two casualties.  
Although in the civil world autonomous cars are developed at high pace, e.g. Google’s 
Driverless Car initiative (Anderson et al.), in the military context, where vehicles go off-road, 
autonomy is still under development. Nevertheless, the technology is promising.  
It is expected that the development of automated and autonomous ground vehicles in logistics 
will be done by civilian corporations first, before the armed forces will implement them. 
These might either be self-driving trucks, delivering goods in a convoy with people-driven 
vehicles, smaller vehicles autonomously delivering goods to soldiers on remote and non-
permissive locations or any other variant suitable for the military (Forsvarets 
forskningsinstitutt, p. 15). 
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8 Discussion 
In this chapter, the influence of the identified emerging technologies on the command and 
control of the supply chain is discussed. The discussion will be structured along, and based on 
the research questions. Discussing the presented theory and research findings, this chapter 
will finally answer the main research question:  
How does modern technology influence the command and control of the 
Army’s supply chain?  
 
8.1 C2 of the supply chain 
What is command and control of the supply chain? It is defined as the set of organisational 
and technical attributes and processes used to organise and execute supply of (army) units 
synchronised with the other joint functions, in order to support the military mission. Although 
one might say that this is very similar to the definition of Supply Chain Management, the 
difference lies in the synchronisation with the other joint functions and the emphasis on 
supporting a military mission. Unlike most civilian supply chains, the military supply chain is 
designed to function in ‘just-in-case’ scenarios as part of a military organisation. It is designed 
to function in situations where everything else has come to a halt. This is reflected in the 
motto of the Dutch Army: “Doorgaan waar anderen stoppen” (Mediacentrum Defensie, 
2016); translated: “To continue where others halt”.  
Considering the increasing reliance on commercial concepts e.g. outsourcing, partnering and 
Performance Based Logistics (PBL) (Listou, p. ix), SCM could be considered a more 
appropriate term. However, being a just-in-case organisation, the armed forces use the term 
C2 instead of management. With respect to the link with the other joint functions and to refer 
to common military terminology, the term command & control is concluded as preferred 
instead of the term Supply Chain Management.  
8.2 Characteristics of military organisations 
What are the characteristics of military organisations from an organisational theoretical 
perspective? Applying Mintzberg’s model of configurations, military organisations have 
aspects of both the machine organisation and the professional organisation, both of which are 
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organisations using standardisation and can be characterised as bureaucracies. The Army uses 
a large set of rules, regulations, job descriptions, etc., to standardise. Meanwhile, instruments 
to circumvent these when necessary, such as Mission Command, are in place. Nevertheless, 
based on the Army being either a machine- or a professional organisation, organisational 
change is handled poorly. The vast set of rules, regulations and standing operation procedures 
have become a kind of culture in the military. Things are done in ways they always were 
done. This has been confirmed by one of the respondents stating: “The organisation’s 
institutional memory will hamper the implementations of new technology”. 
On the other hand, the tools like e.g. Mission Command and the encouragement to take 
initiative should make it easier to innovate. On the tactical level, especially in smaller units, 
this might be true. Deployed units often show a ‘can-do’ approach, where they solve issues by 
creatively making use of the means available. During missions abroad, the researcher was 
more than once impressed by the ingenious solutions of military logisticians in order to get 
things done or to improve daily work. But this is a balancing act when in military operations. 
When engaging combat, either deliberately or as a result of enemy initiative, there is no room 
for informal discussions on how to react. In those situations, the drill, training, standard 
operating procedure has to take over in order for the “machine” to function.  
On a larger scale, when changing environment meets the entire organisation, innovation meets 
the current set of regulations and rules. If innovation does not fit into these, which naturally is 
the case with innovation, the issue has to be raised to the strategic apex. In the machine 
organisation, the amount of information in the strategic apex will be too large to make timely 
decisions in the top, in the professional configuration, the strategic apex will lack the 
knowledge to decide. Both situations will at the least slow change down. 
The armed forces can be characterised as bureaucratic, with characteristics of both the 
machine organisation (standardisation of work processes) and of the professional organisation 
(standardisation of skills). Since the armed forces are rather centralised in organisation, the 
machine organisation configuration is the more appropriate one to describe the Army. 
Although in some highly specialised areas the organisation is more decentralised, possibly 
more resembling the professional organisation configuration. 
Back to the research question. What are the characteristics of military organisations from an 
organisational theoretical perspective? Based on the Army resembling the machine 
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organisation most, it can on one side be described as efficient, reliable, precise and consistent. 
On the other side, it has an obsession with control which eventually leads to adaptation 
problems at the strategic apex. It has a resistance to change and might need a (temporarily) 
switch to an innovative configuration to overcome this (Mintzberg, p. 132). 
8.3 Handling technology 
How can organisations handle new technology? It appears that, depending the kind of 
technology, the organisation has to choose between a central guided development and 
implementation or a more decentralised approach. Since the machine organisation is the 
dominant configuration of the Army, there is probably a preference for central guided 
development. But is this effective?  
As LeMay (2009) wrote, the commander has a critical role in identifying and implementing 
new technology, acknowledging the role of a central leader in handling technology. 
Regarding logistics, or supply, commanders like General Dennis Reimer seem to underline 
this by calling for a revolution in logistics. On the other hand, based on experience, not every 
commander is equally concerned of logistics, possibly resulting in a reduced focus on 
implementing new technology in the supply chain. Nevertheless, there are many reasons why 
technology implementation should be handled centrally.  
If the technology is going to have an effect in the entire organisation, the only entity in the 
machine organisation with the authority to imply change is the strategic apex. Furthermore, 
especially in cases where characteristics of a professional organisation come to play, there is 
need for a central guidance in order to define the technology to implement. If not, 
professionals might end up sub-optimising in search of the best solution for their expertise. 
Resulting in increasing costs and delayed implementation. This is illustrated by one of the 
respondents during the interview.  
“In the [Norwegian] Armed Forces we have had a tradition to modify every 
acquired system to a ‘Norwegian’ model. This increases the products costs and 
delays the delivery, since the adjustments often require a lot of time. The result 
of this often is delivery of (near) obsolete systems by the time they are ready 
developed. 
 
Followed by: 
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“We should buy of the shelf and only make small reasonable adjustments. As a 
result, we might have to, and must adjust routines, regulations, etc.” 
 
Referring to the former reason, authority is needed to change routines, regulations, 
procedures, etc. Besides the above, as another respondent said, “[i]mplementing new 
technologies requires often retraining of employees, which is a time-consuming process” as 
well as costly. In machine organisations, expenditure has to be approved in centralised budget 
processes, which askes for central leadership.  
However, as Schilling (2017) found, it is not always centralisation which is the best way to 
implement new technology or in other words, to innovate. Based on the conclusion that 
(large) machine configured organisations are not as able to adapt or innovate as smaller, more 
entrepreneur configured organisations, an ambidextrous approach was presented to innovate 
within machine organisations. In organisation, the ‘normal’ work is done as it used to be, 
while separate parts or divisions with an organic structure focus on technological innovation. 
The low level of bureaucracy and structure in organic organisation tends to foster innovation, 
because this opens for experimentation and improvisation (Schilling, p. 218). This bypassing 
of bureaucracy and hierarchy is also signalised by respondents. One of them said: 
“We are used to sticking to our old habits, like dinosaurs. Perhaps it's time to 
bring our younger colleagues into play, without staying too hierarchical. The 
dinosaurs do not realise yet they are going extinct”  
 
This indicates a certain will to use the ‘digital natives’, the younger generations17 that already 
are immersed in modern technology (Vassiliou et al.). Empowering them with a level of 
authority or direct support from the strategic apex can circumvent the filtering layers of 
‘dinosaurs’ in the technostructure. In a way, this is a form of centralisation as well. 
The down-sides of isolating innovation within the organisation cannot be denied. Being 
isolated, teams can get tunnelled in their vision, developing solutions that no longer support 
the organisation’s goals. Further, depending on the composition of the innovating team can be 
one-sided, leaving valuable experience aside. Additionally, the more innovation is developed 
                                                
17 In this case, younger generations are not necessarily younger in age. It is the acquaintance with modern 
technology which defines the ‘generation’. 
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in an isolated environment, the more resistance it might provoke on implementing in the 
organisation. No dinosaur likes being told he is going extinct. 
Concluding, it can be said that involvement of leadership at the strategic apex is essential for 
successful implementation of modern technology, also known as innovation. Both in a 
centralised, as well as in a more ambidextrous organisation of innovation leadership’s role is 
essential. Being a machine organisation in nature, it is up to leadership to decide on how to 
organise implementation of new technology. Choosing which organisation configuration fits 
best to the organisational needs, depending the kind of technology and based on a technology 
strategy. 
8.4 The supply chain 
How is today’s supply chain and its command and control organised? As shown in figure 2, 
the supply chain design within the Army is quite straightforward. Based on prognoses, goods 
are pushed through a chain of installations. Starting at NDLO/NLC warehouses, through 
LBL, the CSS battalion and eventually ending when delivering supplies to army units. The 
reality however, is more complicated.  
First of all, not all supply goods are delivered based on prognoses and Standard Days of 
Supply. Especially spare parts and ammunition consumption is hard to predict. One of the 
reasons for this is the calculation tools not being up to date. Another reason is that 
consumption will vary depending the kind of combat intensity. Calculations based on 
consumption will first become available after battle, too late for prediction. As a result, the 
need for communication and coordination in the chain increases. Unpredictable consumption 
has to be ordered, causing unanticipated demands. Secondly, not all deliveries follow the 
chain. As mentioned by the respondents, goods will be delivered directly from civil suppliers 
to army units, bypassing one or several stations in the supply chain. This also, will increase 
the need for communication and coordination. As one of the respondents expected the LBL to 
become the central entry point for supply goods, others point out that supplying the Army 
might become even more outsourced, referring to the supply concept of Home Guard units. 
An issue confirmed in the Defence White Paper (Forsvarsdepartementet). 
The authority to design the supply chain is given to the director of the NDLO, on behalf of the 
Chief of Defence (Forsvaret, 2014a). During operations, the chief of the NJHQ, assisted of its 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
47 
J4 branch, holds command and control over the supply chain. The NJHQ integrates logistics 
(and thus supply) together with the other joint functions into synchronised operational plans. 
Executing and coordinating supply to all branches is been delegated to the NLC, which is a 
part of the NLDO. On the tactical level, commanding both the brigade with its CSS battalion 
and the operational support unit with its LBL, the Chief of the Army seems to have command 
and control over the army part of the supply chain. As concluded in paragraph 3.4, this is only 
C2 over the tactical execution of supply. The command and control of the supply chain is in 
the hands of the NDLO/NLC.  
Although the command and control relations are described in formal and draft documents 
(Forsvaret; Hæren), one can easily see room for misinterpretation and confusion based on the 
summary above. All respondents identify the ambiguity in command and control of the supply 
chain. The establishment of a National Land Operation Centre with a G4 branch at the army 
level is seen as a possible solution to solve this ambiguity. In this way, the Chief of the Army 
could take command of control over the army part of the supply chain. In that way, being the 
custodian on land operations, he can take responsibility for all activities on land.  
Whether this is true remains to be seen. Another respondent pointed out a more clearly 
defined role for the NLC as ‘single point of service’ in supply, confirming the NLDO/NLC 
should remain to have command and control over the supply chain. Starting with the 
provisions on increased reliance and use of civilian logistical solutions in Prop 151 S. 
(Forsvarsdepartementet), the armed forces will be forced towards more intensive contact with 
civil suppliers. Having major parts of the logistics outside hierarchical control, requires civil 
inclusion in military decision making processes (Listou). With its experience, network and 
focus on the civilian side of the supply chain already today, the NLDO is the more appropriate 
entity having C2 over the supply chain. This requires trust between the Army, as a customer 
ordering and receiving supplies and the NLDO as entity coordinating (civil) delivery. 
Investigating governance mechanisms in network relations Haugland and Grønhaug (1995) 
conclude: “If the actors are dependent upon each other, trust may be the most dominant 
governance mechanism”(p. 378). There is only one way to develop mutual trust in military 
operations; intensive training over time. Again, a reason to include (civil) suppliers. 
Back to the research question. How is today’s supply chain and its command and control 
organised? Concluding one can say that both the supply chain and its command and control 
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are described in official documents. In practice, there is divergence in how this is executed, 
leading to an ambiguous situation. Although no agreement between respondents, the NDLO is 
the most appropriate entity to have command and control over the supply chain. Leaving the 
Army to have the responsibility and authority over the tactical execution of supply operations. 
Siting one of the respondents: “The CSS battalion concentrates on the tactics of delivering the 
supplies and has no active role in C2 of the supply chain”. 
8.5 Most promising technologies 
Which emerging technologies are most promising for the Army’s supply chain? A survey of 
research on emerging technologies combined with expert expectations resulted in two 
promising technologies with expected influence on the supply chain. The first is information 
technology in form of Data science, Predictive analytics and Big data (DPB), the other the 
introduction of autonomous vehicles in the supply chain. 
The three elements in information technology cannot be seen separated from each other. Data 
science describes the science of analysing data in order to solve (SCM) problems. Data 
scientist analyse data, based on knowledge of their business and their analytical skills. It can 
be seen as a prerequisite for predictive analytics. Both data science and predictive analytics 
build on the availability of big data, generated by our digital activity. Are these technologies 
implementable in the Army’s supply chain? 
Being a prerequisite for both data science and predictive analytics, big data has to be available 
if these technologies are to be used. Does the Army generate enough data to call it big data? 
Many systems in the Army are digitalised or will be digitalised in the future. The best 
example of this is the infantry fighting vehicle CV90, which has a large number of different 
sensors and computers, able to generate data on e.g. location, expected maintenance, fuel 
level, remaining rounds of ammunition, etc. It is to be expected that other future systems will 
have similar possibilities in generating data. At this moment, there is a development project 
ongoing in the Dutch Army to equip soldiers with sensors that can report on location, health, 
available rounds in the personal weapon, etc. Other sources of big data are more common. 
One can think of information on weather and terrain characteristics, enemy weapon systems, 
availability of civil infrastructure, etc. Based on this, one can conclude that there is a technical 
possibility to generate big data. On the other hand, compared to the huge client databases of 
companies like e.g. Amazon.com or Facebook, any database generated by the Norwegian 
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Armed forces cannot be considered a big database. Before starting to invest in information 
technology an analysis of the size or available databases has to be considered. Another option 
would be to share information with the big data of suppliers to the armed forces. This could 
enable them to act proactively on during operations. The downside of sharing information 
with suppliers is the increased security risk as described by Bestum (2016, p. 52). 
In order to analyse big data and use it both in data science and predictive analytics, the armed 
forces will need personnel with adequate analytical skills. However, analytical skills alone are 
not sufficient as Waller and Fawcett (2013) and Provost and Fawcett (2013) proved. Data 
science and predictive analytics require both analytical skills and profound knowledge of the 
business in which it is applied. Although this domain knowledge could be experience within 
the field of supply in general, given the characteristics of military logistics, profound 
knowledge of military operations will be necessary. Does this mean only soldiers can apply 
for functions as predictive analysts? On the one hand, in the short term, this might be true, but 
in the longer term there might be another possibility as well. Given the right quality of big 
data, it could become possible to program automated algorithms or even self-learning 
artificial intelligence that can predict consumption and automatically order the right supplies 
in advance.  
Autonomous vehicles open a complete other realm of possibilities for the supply chain. 
Although civil corporations like Google, Audi, Tesla and several more are researching and 
developing autonomous driving vehicles, these are not available yet. Nevertheless, it does not 
require much imagination to understand that these kinds of vehicles are on the verge of 
entering commercial markets. How can these be used in the Army’s supply chain? Based on 
the progress of technology, it is possible today to use these kinds of vehicles in the convoys 
traveling from (civil) warehouses towards the forward installations of the LBL or CSS 
battalion. A next step will be automated vehicles moving to (remote) locations without having 
to rely on road infrastructure. Technology has made the most progress in using aerial vehicles 
for this purpose. A commercial example is the DHL Parcelcopter (Kückelhaus & Chung, p. 
45). In military context progress is being made on this as well, as e.g. the earlier mentioned 
‘AirMule’ (Tactical Robotics Ltd). But robots/vehicles with enough stability to go off-road 
are being developed at high pace, such as e.g. Boston Dynamics (2017) its models. 
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Autonomous vehicles have the advantage of lacking a person operating the vehicle. This will 
remove ethical and trust issues in situations where civil suppliers deliver directly to army 
units in hostile environment. Interview respondents showed hesitation on having civil 
suppliers too close to the battlefield. In the first place, the drivers delivering goods are non-
combatants entering a war zone with all the ethical implications. Secondly, truck drivers in 
logistics come from all over Europe, which make one wonder if they would be loyal enough 
to a country to enter these dangerous situations at all. Removing the human from delivering 
vehicles will remove these disadvantages as well. 
A further development step might be the combinations of sensors in the Army updating the 
‘army big data cloud’, generating predictions on consumption and an artificial intelligence 
system anticipating and sending out autonomous vehicles without any person intervening this 
process. But in 2017, this might be a conceptual bridge too far yet. 
8.6 The other side of modern technologies 
Before answering the main research question, the last research question remains: What are the 
disadvantages of implementing modern technology?  
Assuming, for the sake of argument, the data generated by the armed forces is big enough to 
call it big data, can it be used in analysis? In order to analyse data, it has to be collected in 
accessible databases. Collection will partly be done in real time over available networked 
connections. Even if this is technologically possible, it will increase the broadcasting 
signature a deployed unit has, making it easier to detect by the enemy. Furthermore, as one of 
the respondents said, many of the available technologies are based on civil network standards. 
It is doubtful if the FSA and/or NSM will approve these in the armed forces. Additionally, 
containing all kinds of data on armed forces, databases will become true gold mines for 
analysts, both own and those working for opposing intelligence services. On the other side 
technology is under constant development. Using block-chain technology, the integrity of 
digital currency seems to be unhackable and alternatives for transmitting data are being 
developed, e.g. using laser light. With the proper tools to mitigate security risks, information 
security should be no reason not to innovate. 
As pointed out by several respondents, implementing new technology implies a greater 
dependence on e.g. networks, computers, digital communication means and electricity. For 
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the supply chain, relying more on modern technology results in a greater dependence on these 
supporting structures. This makes the supply chain vulnerable in cases where the supporting 
structures are under pressure by for example enemy Counter Network Operations. 
Autonomous vehicles, deciding what to do and where to go based on algorithms and big data 
may become target of these kind of activities as well. Hacking into the positioning system 
might for example make these vehicles to deliver to the wrong locations.  
Redundancy in supplies and means to supply is often seen as a solution for unexpected events. 
A certain surplus in both transportation means and supplies is maintained in order to react 
swiftly on unexpected change in consumption or other issues. Implementing civil based 
technology in the supply chain might threaten this redundancy. Cutting out redundancy in 
order to make the supply chain leaner is often the motivation for commercial corporations to 
use modern technology. The ‘just-in-time’ concept is an example of this approach, cutting out 
stocks at various levels in the supply chain. In the military context, redundancy translates into 
a certain robustness which makes the military supply chain fit for the ‘just-in-case’ scenario’s. 
Cutting out redundancy might threaten the ability to be a ‘just-in-case’ organisation. 
8.7 Influence on C2 of the supply chain 
Conclusively, after having discussed research data and having answered the research 
questions, answering the main research question remains. This thesis’ main research question 
was: 
How does modern technology influence the command and control of the 
Army’s supply chain?  
 
In an attempt to make SCM more recognisable for soldiers and to underline the link with the 
other joint functions, the thesis uses the term command and control of the supply chain 
instead of SCM.  
Based on Mintzberg’s theory on organisation configurations, the military organisations, and 
thus the Army, resemble the machine organisation configuration. The Army can be described 
as efficient, reliable, precise and consistent, while on the other hand having an obsession with 
control, leading to problems adapting to change. In situations which need change, a 
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(temporarily) switch to a more innovative configuration can overcome this adaptation 
problem (Mintzberg, p. 132). 
Leadership has a central role in implementing modern technology in organisations. Both 
while implementing innovation centralised, as well as in an ambidextrous innovation 
structure. Since the strategic apex is the only entity in a machine organisation able to make 
changes in the technostructure, it is up to top leadership at the strategic apex to decide on 
which innovation strategy fits the organisational requirements. In other words, strategic 
management of technological innovation, as part of a comprehensive organisational strategy 
(Schilling, p. 1 until 9).   
Today’s organisation of the supply chain and the way command and control is executed is 
described in various official documents (Forsvaret, 2014a, 2014b; Hæren, 2015). Interview 
results show that there is discrepancy between these documents and the opinion on how this is 
executed, leading to an ambiguous situation. Nevertheless, the NDLO, including the NLC, is 
the most appropriate entity to have command and control over the supply chain. This implies 
the Army not having any command and control over the supply chain, except for the 
execution of actual supply operations on the tactical and technical level, in order to 
synchronise these with the Army’s operations. 
Combining these two conclusions; the NDLO being the most appropriate entity to have 
command and control over the supply chain and the need for a top down innovation strategy, 
acknowledges the director of the NDLO as the custodian for all supply chain related issues in 
the armed forces.  
Data Science, Predictive Analysis and Big Data (DPB) and autonomous vehicles are 
considered having the highest impact on command and control of the supply chain. If the 
armed forces generate and collect the right amount and quality of big data, data science and 
predictive analytics will enable a proactive supply chain, without intermediate levels having 
to interfere. In the future, combined with artificial intelligence, this could even fully automate 
the ordering of supplies. 
Autonomous vehicles are no science fiction anymore. Several commercial companies are 
developing and deploying autonomous vehicles both for civil and military application. Based 
on available technology today, autonomous convoys over infrastructure are possible. The 
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development of autonomous systems to reach remote locations has come a long way already. 
Functional prototypes are just around the corner (Boston Dynamics). Autonomous systems 
will, apart from a reduced need for soldiers to operate trucks in the supply chain, remove 
ethical and security issues when using civil contractors in the last tactical mile. Combined 
with DPB, autonomous vehicles might even be able to make large parts of the supply chain 
completely proactive and autonomous. Delivering resupplies even before a unit knows it 
needs them. 
However, new technology comes with downsides as well. The more digitalised an 
organisation becomes, the more dependent it is on supporting structures like e.g. data 
networks and power supply. Under normal circumstances these tend to be available. Though, 
in the degraded environment armed forces must be able to operate in, these are not 
guaranteed. Even worse, given the dependency on these supporting structures, they can 
become a target for adversaries, aiming at disrupting the Army’s supply. Furthermore, 
collecting big data and combining it in databases, used for data science and predictive 
analytics comes with a similar kind of risk. These databases contain valuable information for 
an enemy as well, making it interesting targets for hacking, espionage or deception.  
Furthermore, in commercial business, implementing technology is often used to make the 
supply chain leaner. Minimising costs while maximising profit by eliminating redundancy. In 
military organisations, this redundancy is often in place to cope with disruption. Cutting out 
redundancy will make armed forces less robust and suitable for crisis situations. 
Based on the previous, several conclusions can be drawn on the implications of modern 
technologies on the C2 of the supply chain.  
Firstly, in the future, due to the implementation of DPB, the Army no longer will be 
concerned with command and control of the supply chain. Based on the possibilities of DPB, 
supplies will be ordered automatically based on the big data generated by the Army’s systems. 
In extremis, army units could get resupplied directly by companies or organisations using 
autonomous vehicles without having to request these. This enables the Army to focus on its 
main task, (combat) operations on the land domain. However, based on being custodian for 
land operations, the Chief of the Army remains responsible for the coordination and 
synchronisation of technical and tactical activities concerning resupplying army units. 
Coordination mechanisms either automated or by human interfaces should stay in place.  
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Secondly, while the Army no longer will be concerned with C2 of the supply chain, the 
NDLO’s role as custodian for the supply chain will be strengthened as a result of 
implementing new technology. The NDLO, with the NLC as executive body, will be at the 
centre of supplying the armed forces. Doing so, it will be able “[to view at] the supply chain 
from an overall system perspective” … “more accurately called a Supply Chain Orientation 
(Mentzer et al., p. 11). 
Finally, being dependent on external organisations for supply, trust becomes the most 
important governance mechanism (Haugland & Grønhaug, p. 378). This askes for embedding 
suppliers in (operational) planning processes, even though sharing information can be difficult 
from the security perspective. To build trust, the supply chain has to be trained as a whole, in 
order to improve and test the chain and to build on mutual trust. 
One of the respondents summarised: 
 “The system should be based on ‘push’ information. That implies among other 
things a reform from a bureaucratic system towards a system based on trust, 
combined with risk acceptance and a common understanding of responsibilities 
and authority.” 
 
One important remaining question is if the Army is willing to give up its active role in the 
command and control of the supply chain. Even though, given functioning supporting 
systems, sufficient trust between the NDLO (including civil suppliers) and the Army is 
acquired, what if the system breaks down? Shouldn’t the current layered structure and C2 
arrangements act as redundancy? This asks for a thorough risk analysis, as part of the 
technological innovation strategy. 
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9 Summary and conclusion 
The intention with this thesis was to analyse the implications of emerging technology on the 
management of the Army’s supply chain. In the previous chapter, the research data has been 
discussed in search for an answer on the main research question:  
How does modern technology influence the command and control of the 
Army’s supply chain?  
 
To answer this question, six research questions were developed as a guidance during research 
based on the research’s design: 
(1) What is command and control of the supply chain? 
(2) What are the characteristics of military organizations from an organisational 
theoretical perspective? 
(3) How can organisations handle new technology? 
(4) How is today’s supply chain and its command and control organised? 
(5) Which emerging technologies are most promising for the Army’s supply chain?  
(6) What are the disadvantages of implementing modern technology? 
After analysis, the study has come to the following main findings: 
(1) Command & control of the supply chain can be defined as the set of organisational 
and technical attributes and processes used to organise and execute supply of 
(army) units synchronised with the other joint functions, in order to support the 
military mission. 
(2) Based on the Army resembling Mintzberg’s machine organisation configuration 
most, it can be described as efficient, reliable, precise and consistent, while at the 
same time confronting adaptation problems when confronted with change.  
(3) Depending on the kind of implications of new technology has, an organisation has 
to choose between a central guided development and implementation or a more 
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decentralised approach. If technology can be applied locally, a decentralised 
approach could be the most effective, in case of a technology with effects for the 
entire organisation, the central guided approach is more appropriate. Given the 
bureaucratic organisation as a starting point for this decision, a technology strategy 
in the top management is crucial. 
(4) Both the supply chain and its command and control are described in official 
documents. In practice, there is divergence in how this is executed, leading to an 
ambiguous situation. 
(5) Two categories of technology are identified as promising and having influence on 
the command and control of the supply chain: Information technology, especially 
predictive analytics and forecasting, and autonomous aerial and ground vehicles. 
(6) Implementing the modern technology as described in this thesis increases the 
dependency on supporting structures e.g. power supply and communication 
networks. These can become a new Achilles heel of the armed forces. Redundancy 
seems inevitable. 
Based on these findings, it is reasonable to assume that implementing modern technology in 
the supply chain will force the Army to hand over the command and control of the supply 
chain to a central organisation, presumably the NDLO with the NLC as its executing body. 
Coordination and de-confliction of activity in the land domain will remain within the Army’s 
responsibility, since the Chief of the Army is the custodian for land operations. Depending the 
technological developments, this can eventually be automated as well. 
Finally, as the Army gets more dependent on other actors for supply, trust becomes an even 
more important governance mechanism which has to be nurtured by planning, training and 
operating comprehensively over time. 
9.1 Further research 
In general, repeating the observation made by Listou (2015, p. 16), “little academic literature 
exists on defence logistics”. Based on this information, any new research on defence logistics 
will be welcomed by scholars in this field. 
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Based on the conclusion that trust will become an important governance mechanism in 
military logistics, further research on the dynamics of trust in interdependent relationships is 
advised. Especially in the ‘just-in-case’ scenario’s. 
The research touches upon one of the downside of implementing new technologies. Reliance 
on supporting structures is increasing. What if these systems break down? Shouldn’t the 
current layered structure and C2 arrangements act as redundancy? This asks for a thorough 
risk analysis, as part of the technological innovation strategy.  
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Abbreviations 
C2 Command & Control 
CIMIC Civil Military Cooperation 
CSS Combat Service Support 
DoD Department of Defence 
DPB Data Science, Predictive Analysis and Big Data 
ERP Enterprise Resource System 
EW Electronic Warfare 
FP Force Protection 
FSA Forsvarets sikkerhetsavdeling; Defence Security Department 
G4 Logistic Branch at a tactical land headquarter 
INFOOPS Information Operations 
INTELL Intelligence 
J4 Logistic Branch at a joint headquarter 
LBL Logistic Base Land 
LOGFAS Logistics Functional Area Services 
NDLO Norwegian Defence Logistic Organisation 
NJHQ National Joint Headquarter 
NLC National Logistic Command 
NLOC National Land Operation Centre 
NSM Nasjonal sikkerhetsmyndighet; The Norwegian National Security Authority 
PBL Performance Based Logistics 
RLP Recognised Logistical Picture 
SAP Systeme, Anwendungen und Produkte in der Datenverarbeitung; (Systems, 
Applications & Products in Data Processing) 
SCM Supply Chain Management 
SDOS Standard Day of Supply 
STM Strategic Technology Management 
TTPs Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UGV Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
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Epilogue 
In the period when I was researching for this thesis, I saw a TV commercial for a new type of 
vacuum cleaner which allegedly was equipped with a digital motor. I did not understand the 
point of that feature, neither do I know what it is, so I asked my wife. She came with a 
convincing explanation: “Almost everybody with a household owns a vacuum cleaner, in 
order to increase profit, they will have to convince everybody that these are not good enough. 
For that they use technology, it is all about increasing profit”. Although a bit sceptical, one 
should keep this in mind when presented new, improving technology.  
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Appendix A; interview guide (Norwegian) 
Innledning 
Dette er et intervju for å samle inn data til en masteroppgave ved Forsvarets høgskole. 
Oppgaven ser på hvordan Hæren bør/kan tilpasse kommando og kontroll i forsyningskjeden 
for å kunne møte og bruke «21st century» teknologi. 
Oppgaven gjennomføres stort sett som kvalitativ litteraturstudiet kombinert med intervjuer av 
fagpersoner i forsyningskjedens nøkkelorganisasjoner. Dette for å kunne bekrefte eller 
avkrefte funn i litteraturstudiet samt å kunne gi motvekt for forskerens eget bilde basert på sin 
erfaring innen fagfeltet.  
 
Formalia 
• Intervjuet er semi-strukturert. Det gjør at vi kan være fleksible i hvordan intervjuet 
utvikler seg. Jeg har ansvar for å få svar på alle mine spørsmål.  
• Jeg tar notater under intervjuet, ikke noe lydopptak. Etter intervjuet transkriberer jeg 
notatene og får du tilsendt de for gjennomlesing og eventuelle kommentarer. 
• Under intervjuet vil jeg prøve å gi sammendrag av det jeg noterte, både for å kontrollere 
om jeg noterte alt du sa og forsto det riktig. 
• Varighet er omtrent halvannen time. 
• Anonymisering; navnet ditt vill ikke bli brukt i oppgaven, kun avdelingen vil kunne bli 
brukt. 
• Oppgaven er ugradert, svar som er graderte noteres ikke. Forskeren har klarering til 
hemmelig. 
• Du kan når som helst trekke deg fra intervjuet. 
• Studien meldes til Personvernombud for forsking, Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig 
datatjeneste AS. 
 
Spørsmål 
1. Kan du beskrive dagens forsyningskjede i Hæren? 
a. Hvilke avdelinger har en rolle i forsyningskjeden? 
 
2. Kan du beskrive din / din avdelings rolle og oppdrag i forsyningskjeden? 
a. På en skala fra 1 til 10, hvor misfornøyd/fornøyd er du med denne rollen / dette 
oppdraget? (1 = Svært misfornøyd, 10 = Svært fornøyd) 
 
3. Hvordan er rolle- eller oppdragsfordelingen til de andre avdelingene i kjeden? 
a. Hva er rollen og oppdraget til de nivåene over deg / din avdeling? 
b. Hva er rollen og oppdraget til de nivåene under deg / din avdeling 
c. Synes du rollene er fordelt på en riktig måte 
d. Har du forslag til en forbedret rollefordeling? 
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4. Hvem styrer forsyningskjeden ifølge deg? 
a. Er dette slik det bør være? Hvorfor (ikke)? 
 
5. På en skala fra 1 til 10, hvor fornøyd er du med dagens forsyningskjede i Hæren? 
(1 = Svært misfornøyd, 10 = Svært fornøyd) 
 
6. Hva er de (største) utfordringene til/i Hærens forsyningskjedens innretning? 
a. Hvilken av de er den største / mest problematiske? Hvorfor? 
b. Har du forslag til forbedring av dette? 
 
7. Kan styring av forsyningskjeden være et av forbedringsområdene og kan du begrunne 
det?  
 
8. Hvis vi tar styring av forsyningskjeden som en av utfordringene, har du forslag til 
forbedring? 
 
9. Gitt en fungerende kommunikasjonsløsning, informasjon er tilgjengelig på alle 
ønskelige nivåer. Hvor mange nivåer bør forsyningskjeden i så fall ha? 
 
10. Tror du at bruk/innføring av moderne teknologi kan forbedre forsyningskjeden? 
Hvorfor?  
a. Hva legger du inn i begrepet moderne teknologi? 
b. Hvilke moderne teknologi tror du vil påvirke framtidens forsyning? På hvilken 
måte? 
c. Om hvilken av de har du størst forventning? 
 
11. Bør forsyningskjeden tilpasses denne teknologien eller omvendt? 
a. Kan du forklare hvorfor? 
b. Hvilke utfordringer koblet til en slik tilpasning forventer du? 
c. Hvilken av de vil være størst og hvorfor? 
 
12. På en skala fra 1 til 10, hvor sannsynlig/lite sannsynlig tror du at moderne teknologi 
kommer til å forbedre forsyningskjeden? (1=svært lite sannsynlig, 10=svært 
sannsynlig) 
 
13. Hvilke problemer tror du eventuelt moderne teknologi kan medføre i forbindelse med 
forsyningskjeden? 
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Appendix B; interview transcript (transformed statements) 
 
R
es
po
nd
en
t (3a) How is today’s supply chain 
organised? 
(3b) How is today’s C2 of the supply 
chain organised? 
(4) Which emerging technologies are 
most promising for the Army’s supply 
chain?  
(5) What are the disadvantages of 
implementing modern technology?  
A Supply is based on prognosis. Deliveries from the 
National Logistic Command (NLC) are largely 
based on Standard Days of Supply (SDOS). A 
problem with this is that the program for 
calculating is not up to date. Furthermore, it has 
no possibility to forecast the consumption of 
ammunitions and spare parts. In these cases, 
much of the forecasting is done based on 
experience.  
The RLC delivers supply goods to the Logbase 
Land (LBL). LBL keeps a large part of the stocks 
for the army/brigade. LBL takes in deliveries and 
makes the goods transportable in the military part 
of the supply chain. 
In some cases, supply goods are directly 
delivered to the using units, either by personnel 
from the RLC or civilian suppliers. Many of 
these truck drives do not have the Norwegian 
nationality and the respondent is in doubt of this 
concept suits a crisis situation. 
LBL delivers the goods to the CSS battalion 
which on its turn executes the tactical resupply of 
the (combat) units. 
On the national level, NJHQ J4 manages the 
supply chain. At this level logistics is 
incorporated in the operational planning cycle. In 
execution, NJHQ has given coordination 
authority to the NLC in order to coordinate the 
execution of supply on its behalf. Within the 
NLC, the execution of supply is delegated to the 
Regional Logistic Command (RLC), but this 
command is not always given the same situational 
awareness. 
The RLC coordinates the delivery from suppliers 
and run the regional ammunition warehouses. 
The NJHQ gets daily updates on the Recognised 
Logistical Picture (RLP) which it uses to adjust 
current plans and as input for future plans. These 
daily updates are sent to the NLC as well. 
In the army, the brigade staff G4 manages the 
supply chain in the army’s area of responsibility. 
(note: in 2018, a National Land Operation Centre 
will be established, this will probably imply a G4 
functionality at army level as well. The hope is 
that this will not lengthen the communication 
lines in logistics). 
The brigade staff G4 is divided into a part which 
leads the supply in current operations and another 
part that takes part in (logistical) planning for 
future brigade operations. The G4 gets daily 
logistical updates from the battalions and uses 
these to plan future operations, to adjust current 
plans (prioritising) and to inform J4 (RLP). 
Proper tools for forecasting / predictive analytics 
and the proper use of these tools. Is seen as the 
most promising technology. 
Track and Trace systems 
Automated reporting by weapon 
systems/platforms. Making use of sensors in the 
system, these will automatically report on the 
amount of fuel, ammunition and technical status. 
Thus, generating data to plan with in the supply 
chain. 
Simulation software to use in training scenarios 
in order to increase the overall competence of 
people working in and with the supply chain. 
 
Costs and effort related to the customisation of 
systems are often high and take a lot of time. 
Therefore, the army / armed forces have to accept 
the systems as they are, even though this might 
imply an adjustment of the way of working.  
This can prove to be difficult after a long period 
where people have been working mainly based on 
experience and gut feeling. It will probably be 
difficult to turn this around and start to rely on 
technology. 
Many of the available technologies (related to 
DPB) will be based on civil network standards. It 
is doubtful if the FSA and/or NSM will approve 
the use of these in the armed forces. 
When implementing modern technology, a 
system gets more dependent on supporting 
structures such as network, electricity, etc. With 
this, an increased need for redundancy and/or 
manual back-up procedures arises. These have to 
be trained as well. 
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t (3a) How is today’s supply chain 
organised? 
(3b) How is today’s C2 of the supply 
chain organised? 
(4) Which emerging technologies are 
most promising for the Army’s supply 
chain?  
(5) What are the disadvantages of 
implementing modern technology?  
The actual distribution of goods is coordinated 
horizontally between the logistic specialists. For 
example, between the G4 and the Regional 
Logistic Command(RLC), between the RLC and 
Logbase Land (LBL), between LBL and the CSS 
battalion, etc. The chain of command is only used 
when professional coordination is not sufficient 
of when prioritising is necessary. 
An improvement would be a more clearly defined 
role as a “single point of service” for the NLC. 
B In general, supply goods are delivered from the 
RLC or civil suppliers to the LBL. From the LBL 
goods are transported to the CSS battalion, which 
transports them to the units in the brigade. Every 
unit in the army has its own supply capacity 
which receives supply goods to the unit. 
Some goods, like for example spare parts or 
ammunitions are delivered directly to the CSS 
battalion.  
 
The NJHQ (executed by the J4 branch) is 
responsible for the supply chain. The 
coordination/management of the supply chain is 
delegated to the NLC. 
Within the Army/Brigade, the G4 is responsible 
for coordinating the supply chain.  
The planning capacity in the C2 of the supply 
chain is not sufficient. Responsibilities have not 
been clear in the past. The expectation is that the 
establishment of a G4 army level will improve 
this, combined with a clearer distribution of 
discretion. Although this remains to be seen. 
One of the biggest challenges is that there has 
never been an exercise where supply has been put 
to the test. So, the size of the supply chain and the 
functioning of the C2 in crisis situations are based 
on assumptions. 
Automated ordering by weapon systems or 
platforms seems the most promising new 
technology. It will improve the ordering system 
in the supply chain. 
But first of all, the current ERP system (SAP) has 
to be used right. 
Furthermore, Data solutions as a basis for 
decision making (predictive analytics / 
forecasting) 
Location based material handling / fleet tracking. 
The demands on operational security make a lot 
of available data solutions unavailable for use in 
the military sector. As of now, logistics in the 
Army are depending on manual registration, 
communication and analysis as a result of these 
restrictions. 
The army/armed forces is/are a hierarchical and 
bureaucratic organisation. Modern ways of 
sharing information/and data without passing it 
through all levels of command first may not fit 
the culture of the organisation. A change towards 
an organisation based on mutual trust is 
necessary, but will take time. 
The use of sophisticated and (partly) automated 
systems will take human involvement out of 
processes. This may result in losing control. 
 
 
C Either by own subunits or civil suppliers, the 
NLC delivers supply goods to any location or 
unit the Army wants them to be delivered. It is 
not prescribed where the supplies shall be 
delivered. In some cases, delivery can be done 
directly to the end user.  It is expected that from 
2018 the LBL will become the entry point for 
deliveries to the army. LBL will be the interface 
The brigade G4 orders supplies based on 
prognosis at the NLC. The NLC, as the 
operational part of the NDLO has all the civil 
contracts in place to order goods and have them 
delivered to the armed forces. It is the director of 
the NDLO who designs the supply chain. During 
operations NJHQ J4 plans logistics, while NLC 
First of all, the right use of the current ERP 
system. Lett the software do its work and use the 
ERP system to collect information needed for 
planning instead of redundancy in reporting. 
Secondly Track and Trace systems to get insight 
in the whereabouts of supplies. 
Thirdly additive manufacturing / 3D printing. 
With new technologies, the focus can sometimes 
shift from the purpose of the military organisation 
to the technology itself. One must be aware of the 
reason for having armed forces: crises and 
conflicts. The technology should support this 
task, if not there is no need for it. 
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organised? 
(3b) How is today’s C2 of the supply 
chain organised? 
(4) Which emerging technologies are 
most promising for the Army’s supply 
chain?  
(5) What are the disadvantages of 
implementing modern technology?  
between the civil and the army part of the supply 
chain. 
From the LBL the goods will be delivered to the 
CSS battalion, which will deliver them to the end 
users.  
executes and coordinates the execution of these 
plans.  
Since the concept for supply in the army not has 
been approved yet, there are differences in how 
people/units perceive their role and responsibility.  
The fact that the supply chain has not been 
trained / putt to the test worseness this.  
The chief of the Army should have responsibility 
over the army part of the supply chain. 
 
Implementing new technology takes its time due 
to: 
- Training and education of the 
personnel involved; 
- The time needed to convince people of 
the positive side of the change. 
Modern technology can make the armed forces 
vulnerable. If the focus is to become more LEAN 
with the use of technology, redundancy will 
disappear and the supply chain will become less 
robust. This might in fact be one of the reasons 
for opposing implementation. 
D Civil suppliers deliver goods to the units of the 
NLC/RLC. These transport or route them further 
to the army LBL. From the LBL, the supplies are 
delivered to the CSS battalion in the Brigade 
Support Area. The CSS battalion delivers the 
goods to the end user.  
Conceptually the supply chain is designed by the 
director of the NDLO, in operations it is leaded 
by NJHQ. Within its organisation, the NLC has 
the executing task. Commander NLC leads 
supply / coordinates logistical operations on the 
tactical level up till the delivery points within the 
army. The chief of the army is the custodian for 
land operations. Since the supply chain in a way 
is part of the land operations there is a large area 
of coordination between the director NDLO and 
the chief of the Army. This gives room for 
disagreement as well. 
The division of roles and responsibilities, 
especially on the interfaces between the NLC and 
Army need clarification. 
The biggest challenges for the C2 of the supply 
chain are related to sharing information and the 
flow of information. A lot of military information 
is not cleared for use by civilian suppliers.  
Given a functioning communication system, the 
army might not need a role in the C2 of the 
supply chain, other than a customer role 
(knowing what and how to order). 
The introduction of autonomous vehicles will 
remove a large part of today’s challenges and 
ethical issues related to the use of civil 
contractors in dangerous/war environments. As 
well as they will simplify the 
(information)security aspect of this. 
Additive manufacturing 
Alternative energy sources (solar energy) 
The increasing dependence on the availability of 
a networks makes the supply chain vulnerable for 
counter network operations 
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(3b) How is today’s C2 of the supply 
chain organised? 
(4) Which emerging technologies are 
most promising for the Army’s supply 
chain?  
(5) What are the disadvantages of 
implementing modern technology?  
E NLC delivers supplies to the National Support 
Element of LBL. At the LBL, civil transport is 
transferred to military transport. LBL delivers the 
supplies to the CSS battalion in addition to this, 
LBL holds a part of the buffer capacity to the 
army.  
The CSS battalion executes the delivery of goods 
to the end users. It concentrates on the tactics of 
delivering the supplies and has no active role in 
C2 of the supply chain.  
At the moment, it is not clear who is leading the 
supply chain for land operations. The plan and 
ordering level (G4/J4) orders supplies with the 
NLC based on operational plans and the units 
demands. NLC orders the supplies at civil 
suppliers based on framework agreements for 
both peace time and war.  
The supply chain has never been trained or tested. 
Only during some table top exercises, the real 
extent of the supply chain has been shown (on 
paper). 
Establishing a G4 branch at the army level will be 
a golden opportunity for the Army to establish C2 
of the supply chain. 
Improved communication systems (wireless) in 
order to establish the bandwidth necessary to use 
the ERP system. 
Autonomous vehicles or drones to supply units in 
extremely hostile or non-permissive 
environments. 
Systems to simulate logistics in (table top) 
exercises.  
The army is like a dinosaur. The people deciding 
on (new) technology are the most experienced 
and thus oldest ones. 
They are used to do things like they “always” 
have been done. Introducing new technology will 
call for younger generations to get responsibility 
and discretion. This might ask for a culture 
change. 
The demands on secure communication and 
sharing information might hamper the 
implementation of new technology. Even if this is 
not a problem for a certain technology, army 
officers might choose not to implement it since 
they conceive security issues. 
 
Translated citations:  
“The Armed Forces have a special need for classifying and shielding information. In practice, many of the available and 
network-based logistics solutions are not approved by the Norwegian National Security Authority (NSM) and/or the Defence 
Security Department (FMA).” 
  
“Implementing new technologies requires often retraining of employees, which is a time-consuming process” 
 
“The organisation’s institutional memory will hamper the implementations of new technology” 
 
“We are used to sticking to our old habits, like dinosaurs. Perhaps it's time to bring our younger colleagues into play, without 
staying too hierarchical. The dinosaurs do not realise yet they are going extinct”  
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“In the [Norwegian] Armed Forces we have had a tradition to modify every acquired system to a ‘Norwegian’ model. This 
increases the products costs and delays the delivery, since the adjustments often require a lot of time. The result of this often is 
delivery of (near) obsolete systems by the time they are ready developed.” 
 
“We should buy of the shelf and only make small reasonable adjustments. As a result, we might have to, and must adjust routines, 
regulations, etc.”  
 
“The system should be based on ‘push’ information. That implies among other things a reform from a bureaucratic system 
towards a system based on trust, combined with risk acceptance and a common understanding of responsibilities and authority.” 
 
“The CSS battalion concentrates on the tactics of delivering the supplies and has no active role in C2 of the supply chain” 
 
 
